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2Abstract
The sense of national humiliation in China derives from a huge psychological gap
between a glorious Empire and a peripheral nation-state which invaded by foreign
imperialists in the 19th century and the early 20th century. This gap let Chinese people
tend to define the period from 1840s to 1940s as the “Century of National
Humiliation”. Although, Chinese people suffer a lot during this “Century”, direct
experience and the meaning attached it are not the same. Apart from history itself, this
thesis argues that narratives of naitoanal humiliation are significant in constructing
China’s national identity. In this sense, it will focus on China’s humiliation narratives
in different periods, and try to find out what kind of role Japan plays in the
construction of China’s national identity. In the first place, this thesis will focus on the
narratives of humiliation/victim in different periods of China since its popularization
in 1915, and try to give a comprehensive picture of the origin and evolution of this
narrative. More specifically, it will examine Chinese humiliation narratives in the
following three main periods chronologically: the origins and evolution of “national
humiliation” in the pre-1949 era, the absense of “national humiliation” from the 1950s
to the 1980s, and the reinvention of “national humiliation” in the post-1989 era. It
argues that the narratives of the national past help construct China’s identities in
different periods with different meanings. In the second place, this thesis examines
not only the discourse of humiliation per se, but also the role that Japan assumes in
both victim narratives and the none-victim narratives, and will utilize a social
“self/other” approach to analyze Japan’s role in the construction of Chinese national
identity. Overall, looking back on Chinese humiliation narratives in three main
periods, this thesis concludes that China's national humiliation discourse is an integral
part of the shaping of national identity and Japan plays an important role in this
process. It also finds out that there is no certain consistency in the interpretations of
the national humiliation throughout the last 100 years in China. The national
humiliation discourse had once disappeared in China during Mao’s era from 1950s to
1980s. However, whether humiliation discourse dominants Chinese civil society or
3not, the ruling governments always play an essential role in shaping the nation’s
identity. Besides, Japan has been an indispensable “other” in China’s construction of
national identity. The popularization and intensification of humiliation discourse in
China have always associated with anti-Japanese sentiments. Therefore, in Chinese
context, Japan always assumes the role as an “enemy” when the humiliation/victim
narrative dominates the civil society.
4Introduction
In December 2012, People.com released an article—2012 Report of China Internet
Public Opinion Analysis. According to this report, Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute
and the anti-Japanese demonstrations rank the first with 177,420,901 online posts on
them.1 The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan has not only drawn
public attention to the Internet, but also caused nation-wide anti-Japanese
demonstrations in China. In September 2012, anti-Japanese protests and
demonstrations broke out in at least 52 major cities of China. Tens of thousands of
Chinese people had participated in this wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations and
expressed their anger after Japanese government announced the decision to
nationalize of the controversial islands. However, this Report of China Internet Public
Opinion Analysis also reported that among demonstrators who smashed Japanese cars
and beat Japanese employees in Hunan Province, some of them even did not know
where the controversial islands were. Nevertheless, these people still directed their
“anger spearhead” at the Japanese. In this sense, it seems to be a sort of sentiment
rooted deeply in Chinese mind. If we look back on those anti-Japanese protests since
the early-2000s, they may give us a clue to this sentiment.
On September 18th, 2003, a sex party held by Japanese businessmen in Southeast
China attracted public attention. In fact, this event itself was not a big deal, but it
happened on a sensitive day, at that day in 1931, Japanese military invaded the north
part of China. Thus, it stirred another anti-Japanese protest online. According to a
survey on Sohu.net, 90% of respondents considered that the Japanese tried to insult
1 “Renminwang Yuqing Jianceshi Fabu ‘2012nian zhongguo hulianwang yuqing fenxi baogao’” (“People.com
public opinion inspection office published ‘2012 Report of China Internet Public Opinion Analysis’”), (2012,
November 21), People.com. Retrieved October 20, 2013, from:
http://yuqing.people.com.cn/n/2012/1221/c210123-19974822.html.
It is worth mentioning that among the top 10 topics, the top 6 are concerning China’s international images,
including China’s territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines, China’s new achievement in space flight areas,
the comparison of 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2012 London Olympics, the popular Chinese cuisine documentary’s
success around the world and the first Chinese writer who won the Nobel Prize in Literature. The common emotion
behinds these topics are a mix of a sense of pride of a powerful China in terms of technology and culture and
concerns about a “soft” China in terms of military.
5and humiliate China by their dirty action.2 Just one month later, in October, a
Japanese-style skit performed by three Japanese students and their Japanese teacher in
North-western University provoked an anti-Japanese demonstration of 7,000 people.3
During the demonstration, people burned Japanese flag outside the Japanese students’
dormitory and shouted “Ribengou gun” (Japanese dogs, get out).4 As for the cause of
this anti-Japanese protest, it was reported that a logo that read “This is the Chinese”
paste on one of the Japanese student’s back finally aroused Chinese students’ great
anger, and made them feel humiliated.5 In August 2005, an online petition was
conducted against Chinese government’s decision to grant a multibillion-yuan train
contract with a Japanese company. Interestingly, the address of their Patriot Alliance
Web was www.1931-9-18.org, one of the humiliation days that Chinese people bear
in their minds.6
It’s not difficult to find that the feeling of humiliation underlies all the incidents above.
It is this feeling of “being humiliated” by the Japanese triggers Chinese people’s anti-
Japanese emotions and actions in recent years. As the 2012 report of China Internet
Public Opinion Analysis concludes, the emotion showed in those Chinese anti-
Japanese protests is a sense of humiliation rather than a sense of pride. “If we consider
the prevalent patriotism in 2008 was a sense of national pride” it argues, “then the
patriotism theme in 2012 reveals oppression, grievance and outrage”.7 Of course,
Chinese people would not feel humiliated merely due to the sex party and Japanese-
style skit; the fundamental reason is, as this article argues, the Chinese “memory of
2 Kahn, Joseph. “China angered by reported orgy involving Japanese tourists,” New York Times, (2003, September
30), p.A5.
3 Japanese students and their teacher wore red bras over their t-shirts, and pranced around stage throwing the
stuffing at their audience. In Japan, such skits are apparently seen as humorous; in China, it was seen as lewd and
offensive. See “Xibei daxue fasheng xuesheng kangyi riben liuxuesheng xialiu biaoyan shijian” (“Students of
North-western University protested Japanese students’ ‘dirty’ performance”). (2003, October 31), Shouhu News.
Retrieved on October 2, 2013, from: http://news.sohu.com/89/04/news215030489.shtml.
4 “Xi’an kangri shiwei yuyan yulie” (“The Xi’an anti-Japanese demonstrations get fiercer and fiercer”), Sing Pao
Daily, (1 November 2003). Retrieved on December 2, 2013, from:
http://www.singpao.com/20031101/international/470627.html.
5 Postgraduate BBS of JiLin University. Retrieved on December 2, 2013, from: http://bbs.jlu.edu.cn/cgi-
bin/bbsanc?path=/groups/GROUP_1/Postgraduate/D8181B436/D8C6D3F95/D85DE5B31/M.1067686766.A
6 Cai, Jane. “Patriots’ website closed because of railway protest; anti-Japan stance over bullet-train bids too
sensitive for authorities,” South China Morning Post, (2004, September 1). Retrieved on October 23, 2013,
from:http://www.scmp.com/article/468585/patriots-website-closed-because-railway-protest.
7 See “Renminwang Yuqing Jianceshi Fabu ‘2012nian zhongguo hulianwang yuqing fenxi baogao’” (“People.com
public opinion inspection office published ‘2012 Report of China Internet Public Opinion Analysis’”).
6history”. At present, nearly every Chinese people’s anti-Japanese protest can be
attributed to historical issues. According to a public survey in 2011, 74.2 percent of
ordinary people and 71.2 percent of students who hold negative views on Japanese
because “Japan has invaded China”.8 In this sense, controversial actions done by
either Japanese government or Japanese ordinary people can easily arouse Chinese
people’s sense of humiliation. Therefore, it seems that there is a close connection
between Japan and the humiliating narrative. There is no denying that Chinese people
have suffered a lot in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the mental
trauma has deeply embedded into the old generation’s mind. Yet, it is worth mention
that direct experience of the war and the meaning attached it are not the same.
Although almost all Chinese people have not experienced that war themselves, they
still feel humiliated by the Japanese.
Thus, it is natural to ask where does this sense of humiliation come from? What is this
sense of humiliation? Whether there has been a certain consistency in the
interpretation of humiliation throughout the last one hundred years in China? And
what kind of role does Japan play in Chinese narrative of “national humiliation” in
different periods of time? In other words, is Japan always considered as a country that
exerted “humiliation” on China in the past century? In order to answer these questions,
this thesis first will look at those literatures concerning the above questions to find
some clues first.
For those literatures on Chinese national humiliation, a considerable proportion of
them link it to Chinese nationalism. Some of them tend to treat the sense of
humiliation as an origin of Chinese nationalism. For instance, Zhang Tiejun believes
that there are two important historical factors which help constructed today’s Chinese
self-identity: “central kingdom” complex and “strong China” complex. The former
one is generated from the ancient time, when China was the center of East Asian
civilization. While the latter implies that the humiliation experience in early modern
8 “2011 Zhongri guanxi yulun diaocha baogao” (“Report of public opinions on Sino-Japanese relations, 2011”).
China Daily. Retrieved on October 17, 2013, from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqjs/2011-
08/04/content_13092005.htm.
7China has become a strong motivation for both Chinese elites and ordinary people to
surpass the West and Japan.9 Yuan Jingdong concurs with Zhang on this point; he
argues that Chinese nationalism falls into two categories. One is the pride in its
glorious civilization, and the other one is kind of sentimental nationalism as a
consequence of the hundred year’s invasion of the Western countries and Japan.10
Gregory Moore considers that the “Century of Humiliation” (1840s -1940s) is one of
the sources of China’s resurgence of nationalism.11 Other scholars highlight the role
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in nationalistic propaganda, which is
characterized by the narrative of national humiliation.12 The similar argument of
these studies is that after 1989 Tiananmen Incident, Chinese leaders quickly began to
emphasize its status as the highest and strongest nationalist power and a defender of
national pride. For instance, Christopher Hughes argues that the concepts like
“national unification” and “against hegemony” were instilled as a new ideology in the
1980s, and he further points out that this nationalistic infusion of ideology has
resulted in a furious nationalism sentiment ten years later.13 In this context, “the more
the party is seen to be taking a hard stance against any perceived ‘revival’ of
‘Japanese militarism’, the more likely it is to be seen as a patriotic force worthy of the
people’s backing.”14 Although these literatures provide us certain point of views to
see the relation between Chinese sense of humiliation and its nationalism sentiment in
recent two decades, they do not pay much attention to the concept “humiliation” itself
and how this concept was interpreted by either Chinese governments or the public
before the 1980s.
As for how can we understand “national humiliation”, David Campbell gives us a
9 Zhang, Tiejun. (2004). “Self-Identity Construction of the Present China,” Comparative Strategy, 23(3):281-301.
10 Yuan, Jingdong. (2008). “Chinese Nationalism and Sino-Japan Relations,” Pacific Focus, 23(2): 212-231.
11 Moore, Gregory J. (2010). History, Nationalism and Face in Sino-Japanese Relations, Journal of Chinese
Political Science, 15, 283-306.
12 Whiting, Allen S. (1995). “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng,” The China Quarterly 142,
p.316; Zhao, Suisheng. (2005). “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?” The Washington Quarterly
29(1): 131-144; Hughes, Christopher R. (2006), Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, NewYork: Routledge;
Gries, Peter H. (2005). “A Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Nationalism: The People, Their Pasts, and Their
Passions,”World Economics and Politics, 11: 42-48; Kang, Su-Jeong. (2013). “Anti-Japanese Popular Nationalism
and China’s Approach Towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese Political Tension, 2001–2006,” East Asia, 30: 161-181.
13 Hughes, Christopher R. (2006). Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, NewYork: Routledge.
14 Suzuki, Shogo. (2007). “The Importance of ‘Othering’ in China’s National identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as
a Stage of Identity Conflicts,” The Pacific Review 20(1), p.26.
8good angle to understand “national humiliation”. He says, “National humiliation is
considered an example of either (1) a determinist notion of primordial national history
that naturally defines eternal enemies, or (2) a political culture that is manipulated by
elites in power politics.”15 In Chinese scenario, the second explanation of “national
humiliation” has won the favor among scholars. As we mentioned above, the majority
of analysts prefer to stress CCP’s crucial role in mobilizing the mass public by using
nationalism rationally. William Callahan’s two articles offer an overall look at the
nation-led narrative of China’s national humiliation. In National Insecurities:
Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism, Callahan points out that the
discourse of national humiliation has been “a common and recurring theme in Chinese
public culture.”16 In this sense, unlike the above articles that focus on the role of the
Communist Party alone, Callahan believes that the role of the Chinese society and the
Nationalist Kuomin Party (KMT) cannot be ignored in the spread of “national
humiliation” discourse. In History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming
nationalism in China, Callahan uses “National Humiliation Day” as an indirect entry
to examine China’s national identity. According to the change of the “National
Humiliation Day” from 1915 to the new century, this article contends “new enemies
generate new humiliations, which in turn not only lead to a quest for military strength
to deal with foreign threats, but to a new construction of national identity to rally the
masses at home.”17 Overall, these two articles provide us a good angle to examine
China’s nationalism from a “national humiliation” perspective. However, Callahan
only puts the narrative of “national humiliation” into the pre-1949 and post-1980s
context without mentioning the interpretation between the 1950s to the 1980s.
Similarly, although it points out “new enemies generate new humiliations”, there is an
absence of explanation about the situation in Maoist age, in which even though the
KMT regime and its US ally had substituted Japan as China’s top “enemy”.
15 Campbell, David (1998). National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, p. 67. Quote from: Callahan,William (2004). “National Insecurities: Humiliation,
Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives:Global, Local, Political, 29(2), p.203.
16 Callahan, WilliamA. (2004). “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,”
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(2), p.214.
17 Callahan, WilliamA. (2006). “History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China,”
Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), p.192.
9In this regard, He Yinian’s article can be seen as a good complement of the above two.
In his Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and
Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006, He stresses the indispensable role of Chinese
ruling political elites on China’s “history construction”. By answering the question
“Why did not China and Japan started the quarrel about history until more than three
decades later, the early 1980, when the majority of the population no longer had direct
experience of the war and the two countries had developed close economic and social
ties?”18 He finds out that the fundamental cause of Sino-Japanese political disputes
and conflicts is the “history issues” which manipulated by the communist ruling elites
for instrumental purposes. More specifically, He argues that the political elites of
China only resort to the “history issue” at international level when they feel threats
from domestic opposition forces. Although He raises a good question, he does not
give a comprehensive answer to it. To be more specific, if we look at this question
from a broader view, and take the pre-1949 regimes after Qing Dynasty into account,
the “history issue” is not only used by the CCP government but also utilized by the
KMT government to mobilize the mass during wartime.
As for the first explanation of “national humiliation” by Campbell, though it is less
popular than the second one, some analysts do provide us with a good lens to see the
role of the perceived “enemies”. Suzuki Shogo tries to examine Japan’s role in the
construction of China’s national identity from a social “self/other” perspective. She
contends that a sense of “victimhood” could be seen as the main character of China’s
national identity, and Japan has always assumed the role as an “other” or an “enemy”
in the construction of Chinese national identity. In this sense, Japan’s role will
enhance China’s self identity as a “victim”. In contrast to those who exaggerated
CCP’s role in infusing the public with the victim narrative, Suzuki attaches more
significant on the influence of the history itself. As she argues, “history is more than
just part of a ‘tool kit’ that can be rationally utilized by the political elite, and that
18 He, Yinan. (2007). “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-
Japanese Relations, 1950–2006,” History and Memory, 19(02), p.44.
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states are moral agents that are deeply affected by history.”19 Therefore, from her
perspective, Japan’s role as an immoral “other” is not invented by the authorities. On
the contrary, it has deeply rooted in Chinese people’s mind, including those ruling
elites. Although Suzuki’s article highlights the nature of Japan’s negative history in
the process of China’s identity construction, it fails to explain the question why there
is a once a silence in the history disputes between these two countries. In this respect,
even though real history plays a significant role in Sino-Japanese relations, the official
interpretation of the existing history cannot be ignored to understand relations
between China and Japan.
Based on the above literatures, this thesis tries to give a more comprehensive picture
of the origin and evolution of the narrative of national humiliation and the role Japan
plays in this narrative. First, different from the existing literatures, this thesis mainly
focuses on narratives of humiliation/victim in different periods of China since its
popularization in 1915. To be more specific, it intends to examine this victim
narrative in the following three main periods chronologically: the origins and
evolution of “national humiliation” in the pre-1949 era, the lack of “national
humiliation” from the 1950s to the 1980s, and the reinvention of “national
humiliation” in the post-1989 era. Second, by using substantial documents, this thesis
will analyze humiliation discourses in each period from various aspects, including,
public speeches of leaders, school textbooks, state-run newspapers, publications, films,
etc. to find out whether the national humiliation discourse dominates Chinese civil
society, and if not, what the alternative narrative it is. Overall, through using “national
humiliation” discourse as an entry to analyze China’s national identity, it tries to
argue that China’s humiliation discourse is an integral part of the shaping of national
identity. Third, this thesis intends to analyze not only the discourse of humiliation per
se, but also the role that Japan assumes in both victim narratives and the none-victim
narratives. As mentioned above, there is a connection between Japan and Chinese
national humiliation narrative. As Callahan says, different “enemies” will generate
19 Suzuki, Shogo. (2007). “The Importance of ‘Othering’ in China’s National identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as
a Stage of Identity Conflicts,” The Pacific Review, 20(1), p.23.
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different humiliations, which in turn require different construction of national identity.
In this regard, like Suzuki, this thesis tries to utilize a social “self/other” approach to
analyze Japan’s role in the construction of Chinese national identity.
With respect to the structure for this thesis, in the first section (The Century of
Natioanl Humiliation), it will give a clear explanation of why the narrative of national
humiliation emerges in Chinese civil society, and examine the content of the national
humiliation discourse. In the second section (Victim Narrative in the Pre-1949 Era), it
will focus on the origins and evolution of the humiliation discourse in the pre-1949
Republic of China (ROC) period. More specifically, the pre-1949 Republic period can
be divided into two parts: Beiyang government (1912-1927) and the Nationalist KMT
government (1927-1945). As for Japanese role in this period, though the “Century of
National Humiliation” discourse involves both the Western countries and Japan, the
Japanese had gradually become the primary “enemy” of Chinese due to Japanese
military’s continuing aggression. In the third section (The Absence of Victim Narrative
in China’s Civil Society, 1950s-1980s), it will look at the period from the 1950s to the
1980s, in which national Mao’s class-based ideology and Deng’s pragmatic
philosophy dominated the society separately. This thesis intends to divide this period
into two subparts: Maoist era (1949- the late 1970s) and a pragmatic China under
Deng (1970s-1980s). Moreover, it tries to examine whether the victim narrative was
still the main theme in these two periods, and if the answer is no, what were the
alternative narratives. In the fourth section (The Revival of Victim Discourse since the
Late-1980s), it will focus on the post-1989 era, when the “Patriotic Education
Campaign” was launched by the government. During this “Patriotic Education
Campaign”, the narrative of “national humiliation” has been increasingly embedding
within government organizations, popular culture, and public media.
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The “Century of National Humiliation”
Chinese sense of national humiliation derives from the huge psychological gap
between its central status of the Eastern Asian during its 5,000-year civilization and
the invasion by foreign imperialists since the 19th century. The pride from China’s
5,000-year civilization and the stigma in China’s 100-year humiliation by theWest and
Japan together construct the narrative of its past. Base on the glorious 5,000-year
civilization in the past, history of being invaded by the foreigners makes the Chinese
feel difficult to accept, and the gap between the past prosperity and what happened in
contemporary China let Chinese to define the later as a “humiliation”. As Gries
comments, “the ‘Century’ threatened a Chinese identity based upon the idea of a
universal and superior civilization—the ‘5,000 years.’”20 Chinese pride of their
5,000-year civilization is one of the essential points to understand the current
humiliation discourse in China. It is easy to find Chinese “pride of history” from daily
news or articles. For instance, Beijing Youth Weekly once published an article named
“Chinese beat Garry Kasparov!” in 1997. The article claimed that it was two America
born Chinese programmers that beat Mr. Kasparov. It finally concluded that all the
achievements in China today are derived from the 5,000-year civilization heritage,
and we Chinese should be proud of it.21 This logic of thinking is quite pervasive in
contemporary China. It is not exaggerating to say that the “5,000-year civilization”
has become as a burden for China. The glorious civilization in ancient China make
Chinese people feel difficult to accept the truth that it has been aggressed by the
Western countries, let alone Japan—once was a vassal country in Chinese Empire
from 1842 to 1945. Thus, the narrative of the “Century of National Humiliation”
emerge to show a sense of loss, which came from the gap between a “world empire”
and “a chunk of meat on the chopping block”.
The narrative of the “Century of National Humiliation” determines the way how
20 Gries, Peter H. (2005).”Nationalism, Indignation and China’s Japan Policy,” SAIS Review, 25(02), p.109.
21 “Women you Zuiyouxiu de Rennao” (“We have the most brilliant brain”), (1997), Beijing Youth Weekly, 98: 30.
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Chinese deal with the Western and its immediate neighbor—Japan. As many
textbooks tell, this century began with the Opium Wars (1840-1842), in which the
Qing Dynasty was defeated by the army of British and was forced to accept an
unequal treaty—“the Treaty of Nanjing”. According to the treaty, Qing court not only
had to open its markets to British opium, but also needed to cede five coast cities
(Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai) to British as free ports and gave
Hong Kong to the British government. China’s defeat in the Opium War symbolized
the collapse of the old empire and the start of national humiliation. Later on, the
Second Opium War (1856-1860) was launched by the joint army of British and
French. The results of this war were: first, Qing Dynasty had to open more ports cities
for trade; second, it lost 1,500,000 km2 northern territorial areas to Russia who
participated in the war just as a mediator. Apart from the economic and territory loss,
another symbolic event happened during this war was the occupation and loot of the
Yuan Ming Yuan Garden. The ruins of this former royal garden seem to leave a
profound psychological trauma on Chinese from generation to generation. According
to Wu, the ruin of Yuan Ming Yuan is “the first and most important modern ruin in
China”,22 and now it still serves as remains of Chinese humiliating history.
If the wars in China is considered as inevitable experiences of an Asia country who
confronted with the West-led international society at the first time, or as a throe of
transformation from an empire to a barbarian in the Westphalian system as some
English school scholars believe,23 Japan is always an exception. Japan faced a similar
situation with China in the middle of 19th century, but it had stepped on a different
route. After forced to open its door by the American, Japan decided to learn from the
Western and then launched the Meiji Restoration in 1868 which brought Japan into a
status as one of the powers in the world.
As a consequence, in 1895 Japan defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese War and
22 Wu, Hung. (1998). “Ruins, Fragmentation, and the Chinese Modern/Post- modern,” in Gao, Minglu, ed., Inside
Out: New Chinese Art, San Francisco: San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, p. 60.
23 Gong, Gerrit W. (1984).The Standard of Civilization in International Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.5-
165; Zhang, Yongjin. (2001). “System, empire and state in Chinese international relations,” Review of International
Studies, 27(05): 43-63.
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imposed another unequal treaty on Qing court. “Treaty of Shimonoseki” required
Qing to cede the Penghu group, Taiwan and the eastern part of Liaodong Peninsula in
perpetuity. And this treaty confirmed the opening of seven ports (Beijing, Shashi,
Chongqing, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Xiangtan, Wuzhou) to Japanese trade. So far, Japan
had transformed from a vassal country in Empire system to a powerful sovereign state
in Westphalian system while China was still struggling with the everchanging
environment. The 1895 Sino-Japanese War reveals the antagonistic history between
China and Japan. More importantly, it brought an extensive debate among Chinese
elites on nationalism, and inspired the Chinese to set up their mind to rebuild China as
an independent and strong state in the international community. Although the
“Century of National Humiliation” started in the middle of 19th century, national
humiliations day in China was not emerged until 1915, when Japanese imperialist
imposed the unequal treaty “Twenty-one Demand” on Chinese government.
As its military capability grew, Japanese finally engineered the invasion to the
northern part of China. On September 18th, 1931, Japan occupied Manchurian and
supported the last Qing court’s Xuantong Emperor Puyi as the emperor of Manchukuo.
The occupation of northern China was the first step of Japanese strategy in China. On
July 7th, 1937, Japanese army’s invasion of eastern China finally triggered the second
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which was an integral part of Japanese military’s
strategy of building the “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”. Therefore, to conquer the
whole country became an imperative step to realize Japanese “goal”, but at the same
time, the Chinese has suffered considerably in wartime. During the second Sino-
Japanese War, Japan had once occupied vast Chinese territory and its army did
committed war crime against Chinese civilian. Among those crimes, NanjingMassacre
and the activities of Japan’s Unit 731 are considered as typical examples of the crimes
of Japanese military by the Chinese. In the case of Nanjing Massacre, over 300,000
civilians were killed by the Japanese army according to Chinese official data.24
24 Some scholars consider that Chinese leaders set the numbers of victims in Nanjing Massacre at a high level
intentionally. See Coble, Parks M. (2007). “China's "New Remembering" of the Anti-JapaneseWar of Resistance,
1937-1945,” The China Quarterly, 190: 394-410.
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Moreover, it is reported that 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women were raped by Japanese
soldiers during their invasion and occupation of Nanjing.25 As for the activities of
Unit 731 in Northeast China, Harbin, Japanese scientists used Chinese prisoners to
conduct experiments “from the study of the Bubonic Plague to vivisections”. It is
estimated that ranging from 3,000 to 10,000 Chinese lost their lives at the camp of
Japanese Unit 731.26
Based on the above history, the “Century of National Humiliation” is not merely an
invention of Chinese elites to motivate the mass population, it is a century, in which
Chinese people did suffer tremendously, and the memories of the wartime have
deeply rooted in Chinese people’s mind. However, apart from the history itself, the
narrative of history is also significant in constructing a nation’s identity. In the next
few sections, the author will focus on the government’s interpretation of Chinese
history in both pre-1949 period and post-1949 periods to find whether there has been
a certain consistency in the interpretation of the humiliation discourse in the past 100
years since the concept was invited to the public.
Victim Narrative in the Pre-1949 Era
To some scholars, only Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies on the victim narrative
which used as a tool to mobilize the public. Moore argues that the Communist state
has been working hard to “create a sense of nationhood among all its citizens” by the
help of nationalism.27 It is true that the communist party plays an important role in
national propaganda. However, in the pre-1949 era, governors, intellectuals,
merchants as well as students cannot be ignored in the process of creating and
popularizing the narrative of national humiliation. In other words, the propaganda of
25 Chang, Iris. (1997). The rape of Nanking: the forgotten holocaust of World War II. New York: Basic Books. P.6.
26 Moore, Gregory J. (2010). “History, Nationalism and Face in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Journal of Chinese
Political Science, 15, p.289.
27 Zhao, Suisheng. (1998). “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen
China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(3): 287-302.
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national humiliation is not exclusively used by CCP. According to Callahan,
“patriotism and national humiliation were also closely linked in editorial
commentaries and history textbooks in early twentieth century.”28 Thus, it is neither a
new policy in the period of the KMT’s Republic of China (1927-1948), nor “a twenty-
first-century phenomenon”,29 it has been an essential part of the common historical
narrative since the early 1900s. Therefore, the discourse of national humiliation is a
recurring theme existed in both pre-1949 regimes and post-1949 communist China. It
is also worth mentioning that though this “Century of National Humiliation” discourse
involves western countries and Japan, Japan was Chinese people’s primary “enemy”,
which can be observed through the establishment of “National Humiliation Days” and
the increasingly-enlarged influence of the national humiliation discourse during the
pre-1949 era.
The origin of humiliation narrative during Beiyang government (1912-
1927)
The humiliation discourse first emerged in January of 1915 when Japan imposed an
unequal treaty—“Twenty-one Demand” on Chinese Beiyang government (1912-1927),
which seriously violated Chinese national sovereignty. Although, “there was talk of
China being humiliated before 1915, the discourse of national humiliation in an
organized form dates from 1915”30. After the final signing of this “Twenty-one
Demand” with Japan on May 9th, 1915 made by Beiyang government, the public
tended to mark this event as a national humiliation. The slogan “Never forgot National
Humiliation” was “painted on walls, coined into trade-marks, and imprinted on
stationery”31 and this sentence was soon added into the content of school textbooks to
28 Callahan, WilliamA. (2006). “History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China,”
Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), p.185.
29 Callahan, WilliamA. (2004). “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,”
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(2), p.210.
30 Ibid.
31 Luo, Zhitian. (1993). “National Humiliation and National Assertion: the Chinese Response to the Twenty-one
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let the youth never forget this humiliation. This sentiment had been embedding into
citizen’s everyday lives during that period. On May 20th, Jiangsu (province)
Educational Association accepted a Chinese business man’s proposal to mark the May
7th, when the Japanese gave Chinese government the ultimatum, as the “National
Humiliation Day”.32 Although national humiliation day was not a legal holiday at that
time, Beiyang government gave their tolerance to social groups and people in schools
to commemorate it themselves. Therefore, each year on this day, a large number of
anti-Japanese movements were organized by those social groups throughout China,
which includes: rallies, boycotts of Japanese products, and activities organized by the
overseas Chinese and students. Later, this “National Humiliation Day” was continued
by the KMT regime officially from 1927 to 1940.33
During the period of Beiyang government, representatives of social power, for
example, students, intellectuals, merchant groups, rather than the government showed
more anger to this unequal treaty, and displayed more passion to popularize the
discourse of “national humiliation” in order to mobilize all Chinese people to against
Japan. Young people always wore armbands marked “national humiliation”, draw
pictures onto street walls and made public speeches in front of street theatre to show
how vicious the Japanese was.34 Chinese intellectuals initiated a lot of public
publications, in which showed a strong sense of humiliation. Soon after the signature
on the “Twenty-one Demands”, a book named Wuyuejiuhao Guochishi (History of
May 9th National Humiliation Day)35 was published. Aiming at arousing Chinese
national spirit and keeping this national humiliation in mind everlastingly, this book
collected numerous negotiation documents between Beiyang government and Japan as
well as editorials on this unequal treaty from influential newspapers in China. Later, a
magazine named Guochi (National Humiliation) and a book similarly entitled Guochi
Demands,”Modern Asian Studies, 27(2), p.310.
32 Ibid. May 7th is the day when the Japanese gave Beiyang government the ultimatum.
33 The Nationalist KMT government changed the National Humiliation Day from May 7th to May 9th, in which the
Yuan government singed the “Twenty-one Treaty” with Japan.
34 “Yongyuan buwang: guochi jinian xiaoshuo” (“Never forget: A national humiliation commemorative story”),
Shenbao, (1928, May 9).
35 Yi, Yin. (1915). “Wujiu guochishi” (“History of May 9 Humiliation”). Shanghai: Guowen Shuju.
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were also published in the year 1915.36 Since then, Chinese patriotic intellectuals had
started to construct “national humiliation” as a collective memory intentionally. As for
Chinese merchants, some of them chose to hang national humiliation flags and
banners outside and reserved their stores for one day to commemorate the national
humiliation. The contents of those banners were often “May 9th, do not forget the
national humiliation”, “Return our territories—Dalian and Lvshun”,37 “Annulling
the Twenty-one Demand”, etc. Others decided to continue their businesses but donated
sales turnover on national humiliation day to a foundation sponsored by various
commercial chambers in order to redeem the reparations.38 In addition, commodities
embalming “national humiliation” also stood out at that time to meet the popular
need—“Cleansing National Humiliation”. For instance, a towel company had
designed its advertisement to lead its consumers to link washing face to washing away
national humiliations.39 For ordinary Chinese, the best way to express their
indignation towards “Twenty-one demands” was the movement against Japanese
goods. Since then, boycotting Japanese goods had been served an indispensable “tool”
among Chinese when dealing with Japan until “New China” was built in 1949 by the
communists. Interestingly, half of a century later, since the early-2000s, this traditional
action has recaptured by Chinese nationalists when China has diplomatic disputes with
Japan.
The popularization and intensification of national humiliation discourse among
Chinese was associated with the upsurge of Chinese people’s anti-Japanese sentiment.
If we consider the event happened in 1915 as the beginning of both the discourse of
national humiliation and anti-Japanese sentiment, then the May Fourth Movement
(1919) could be seen as the climax of both of them, and in turn, deepened the feeling
of national humiliation as well as the anti-Japanese sentiment. Initiated by college
36 Cohen, PaulA. (2002). “Remembering and Forgetting: National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China,”
Twentieth-Century China, 27(2): 4-17.
37 They are two Chinese northeast coastal cities that Yuan shikai government ceded to Japan in “Twenty-one
Demand”.
38 “Shandonglu shanglianhui zhiwujiuchi” (“May 9 humiliation of Shangdong Road commercial chamber”),
Shenbao, (1922, May 8), p.13.
39
Shenbao, (1925, May 9). Quote from: Callahan, WilliamA. (2006). “History, identity, and security: Producing
and consuming nationalism in China,” Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), p.202.
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students, the target of the movement aimed at protesting Chinese government’s
response to the “Treaty of Versailles” which grants territories in Shandong to Japan
after the surrender of Germany. On May 4th, more than 3,000 college students in
Beijing marched in front of Tiananmen, and chanted “Abolish the ‘Twenty-One
Demands’”, “Struggle for the sovereignty” and “Beat the imperialistic Japanese”. In
addition, students in Beijing called for a large scale of boycott of Japanese products.
Tsinghua University’s students even burned Japanese goods on campus to vent their
anger. The May Fourth Movement can be considered as a prelude to the mass
demonstrations of Chinese students. Since then, anti-foreign imperialism, especially
anti-Japanese, has become an integral theme among Chinese nationalists. The slogan
like “Beat the imperialistic Japan” and the actions like boycotting and burning the
Japanese goods in the May Fourth Movement are still used by Chinese nationalists
today in anti-Japanese protests.
“National humiliation” in Kuomin Party (KMT) government and Japan
as a “national enemy”(1927-1948)
Since 1927, when Kuomin Party (KMT) troops nearly controlled the whole country,
the discourse of national humiliation had gradually served as a government
instrumental tool to “construct citizenship and national identity in the Republic of
China”40. The commemoration of “National Humiliation Day” was carried on when
KMT took over the power, and finally it was acknowledged legally in 1928.41 Since
then, the KMT authority had used its political power to narrate “national humiliation”
nationwide. Differing from Beiyang government period, in which social groups rather
than the government played a more essential role in popularizing the narrative of
“national humiliation”, “national humiliation” had served as a tool of the KMT
40 Callahan,WilliamA. (2006). “History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China,”
Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), p.185.
41 The Nationalists Party changed the National Humiliation Day from May 7th to May 9th, in which the Yuan
government singed the “Twenty-one Treaty” with Japan.
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government to unify the entire country since it took the power in 1927.
In the first place, KMT government inherited the national humiliation narrative from
the previous government, and then summarized all the national humiliation days,
which had been commemorated by the public privately, into a national calendar. Since
China had been “humiliated” by foreign imperialists numerous times started from the
Opium War, the KMT government issued an official calendar that contained totally 26
national humiliation days, which were commemorated by the public privately,
throughout the year.42 Through “nationalizing local customs” and inheriting the
commemoration of national humiliation days, KMT government showed its intention
of utilizing the “national humiliation” myth to construct a uniform national identity,
that is “a ‘China’ worthy of being saved”.43
In the second place, KMT government gradually reset the “National Humiliation
Days” throughout the whole nation. In May 1928, when KMT’s Northern Expedition
was going to complete, Cai Yuanpei, the director of Education Ministry of KMT
government, sent a telegram to colleges and provincial education departments
nationwide. According to this telegram, all schools should commemorate the
“National Humiliation Day” from 7th May to 9th May.44 It was the first time that the
importance of “National Humiliation Day” was stressed in the education fields put
forward by the government. One year later, on 1st July, 1929, KMT government passed
the list of revolution memorial days in the party’s 20th central standing committee
conference, in which “National Humiliation Memorial Days” were set as the following:
3rd May, Jinan Incident national humiliation day;45 9th May, “Twenty-one Demand”
national humiliation day; 30th May, Shanghai Incident national humiliation day;46
42 Lian, Xinbian. (1966). “Guochi shiyao” (“Brief history of National Humiliation”). She, Yunlong (Ed.) Jindai
Zhongguo Shiliao Congji, vol.90. Taipei: Wenhai Chubansh.
43 Callahan, William A. (2006). “History, identity, and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China,”
Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), pp.179-208.
44 “Guochi jijian” (“Memorial of national humiliation”), Zhongyang Ribao (Central Daily News) (1928, May 7),
p.3.
45 On May 3rd, 1928 (during KMT’s Northern Expedition), Japanese military killed thousands of Chinese
civilians and soldier on an excuse of protecting Japanese citizens in Jinan.
46 On May 30th, 1925, a Chinese worker was killed by his Japanese employer in factory.
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23rd Jun, Shaji Incident national humiliation day;47 29th August, Treaty of NanJing
national humiliation day;48 7th September: the Boxer Protocol national humiliation
day.49 The conference decreed that the whole nation was required to hang flags at
half-mast in the first four national humiliation days, but “National Humiliation Days”
could only be commemorated by those selected delegates of official institutions,
people in schools, and social groups in formal rituals.50 Moreover, KMT government
proclaimed that parades without official authorization would not be tolerated. In this
sense, the authority had become the only legal actor to organize the commemoration of
“national humiliation”.
On 10th July, 1930, the list of national humiliation days was confirmed by the 100th
standing conference of the 3rd KMT central executive committee again, while the
number of the national humiliation days was reduced on the grounds of redundancy.
From then on, 9th May, had been the only legal national humiliation day to represent all
national humiliations that Chinese people had suffered until 1940. Since 1937, the
commemoration on 9th May was combined with July 7th, in which day the Japanese
forces invaded Beijing, the capital city of China. Three years later in 1940, as it
proclaimed officially, “Since July 7th, 1937, the whole nation has been involved in the
war of anti-Japanese. Therefore, July 7th now serves as the ‘War of Resistance
commemoration day’, May 9th is no longer necessary.”51 To some degree, whether the
government changed the legal “National Humiliation Day” or not, Japan was always
47 On June 23rd, 1925, based on Shanghai Incident, Shanghai citizens organized a demonstration to protest
Japanese employer’s inhumane behavior, but were shot by the Britain and French cops, hundreds were dead.
48 China was defeated by the army of British in the Opium War. On August 29th, 1842, Qing court was forced to
accept the unequal treaty—“the Treaty of Nanjing”. According to the treaty, China not only had to open its markets
to British opium, but also needed to cede five coastal cities and Hong Kong to British government.
49 In 1898, the Boxer Rebellion, which is motivated by nationalism and anti-imperialism, took place in China. On
June 21st, 1900, Qing court authorized a war against the foreign imperialists with the Boxers. Foreigners and
Chinese Christians were under siege by the Qing’s force and the Boxers for 55 days in Beijing Legations. Later, the
eight-nation alliance defeated the Qing’s force and the Boxers and captured Beijing. As a consequence, the Qing
court had to sign the Boxer Protocol on 7th September.According to this protocol, sixty-seven million pounds
should be paid as an indemnity to the eight nations involved.
50 Zhang, Yan & Sun, Yanjing. (Ed.). (2009).Minguo shiliao congkan, Zhengzhou: Daxiang Chubanshe, p.147.
51 “Zhongyang feichu wujiu jinian” (“Central government cancels May 9th commemoration”), Shenbao (1940,
May 7), p.4. It is worth mentioning that there is no official “National Humiliation Day” in P. R. China at present.
Nevertheless three specific dates are considered to be the “National Humiliation Day” by the general public: May
9th, September 18th, and July 7th.The similarity shared by these three dates is the involvement of Japan. On May 9th,
1915, Chinese government received the unequal treaty forced by Japan, on September 18th, 1931, Japanese force
occupied the Manchurian (northeastern China), and on July 7th, 1937, Japanese army invaded China’s capital city
Beijing and triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War.
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served as a representative of those “enemies” who had humiliated Chinese for before,
because May 9th is the day that the Beiyang government received Japanese unequal
treaty—“Twenty-one Demand”, and July 7th is the day the Japanese forces invaded
Beijing and triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Accompanied with the reset of “National Humiliation Days” under KMT government,
the role of Japanese imperialist as a “national enemy” had gradually embedded into
Chinese people’s mind through the propaganda of the authority. When Education
Ministry of KMT government required that all schools should establish and
commemorate “National Humiliation Days” from 7th May to 9th May, special courses
must be imparted to students during these three days to let them know more about the
imperialist Japan, who had humiliated the whole nation. The special courses include: 1.
Nationalism; 2. Researches of Japan, for example, geography, history, population,
economy, military, culture, etc.; 3. The history of Sino-Japanese relations. The
objective of the generation in special courses was to let Chinese youth touch the
essence of the memory of national humiliation.52 What is more, When the KMT
government authorized that there were, in all, six “National Humiliation Day”
deserved memorized throughout the whole year, attentions ought to be caused that
Japan occupied four sixth of it. In other words, Japan was playing a significant role in
the discourse of Chinese national humiliation under the control KMT government.
The narrative of “national humiliation” and Japanese role as “national enemy” were
also emphasized by the practice of “National Humiliation Days”. In accordance to the
governmental legislation, during 1930s, the “9th May National Humiliation Day” was
commemorated mainly through the “public memorial” rituals organized by local KMT
offices. Local party office generally convened social representatives of all working
fields to participate in the “public memorial” ritual, in the morning of 9th May. The
procedure of the ritual was uniform. Firstly, all participants stood up and sung “song of
KMT party”. Secondly, participants saluted the party flag and the chairmen of the
52 “Zuori wujiu guochi jinian dahui” (“Yesterday’s May 9th memorial conference”), (1927, May 10), Shenbao,
p.13.
23
ritual read the will of KMT former president Sun Yat-sen. Then, everyone stands in
silent tribute for three minutes. Next, the chairmen would give the main report and
representatives giving speeches respectively. Finally, shout slogans together. The
contents of the slogans practically were: “do not forget our national humiliation”, “to
revoke the consular jurisdiction”, “to recover the national territorial concession”, “to
abolish the unequal treaties”, and “to defeat the Japanese imperialist”. The posters
putting on the wall of the auditorium always read: “Our biggest enemy is the Japanese
imperialists”, “the aim of national humiliation memorials was to encourage us to put
great efforts on the work of anti-Japanese”, “the first step of cleansing the national
humiliation was the consciousness of humiliation”, “the effort on the domestic
products campaign is to promote the quality of domestic goods, patriotic citizens
should not buy Japanese goods”, and “the atrocious Japanese is our only enemy”,
etc.53
Japan’s increasingly deepening role in Chinese humiliation myth was reflected not
only by the selection and practice of “National Humiliation Days”, but also through the
official propaganda goals on these days. Associated with the list of national
humiliation days, a supporting document—brief history and primary propaganda task
the revolution memorial days also announced to stipulate and emphasize the main
propaganda tasks on those national humiliation days in 1929. Take Jinan Incident
national humiliation day on 3rd May as an example, propaganda tasks for this
commemoration were: first, to denounce Japanese savage actions in city Jinan; second,
to reveal Japanese imperialist’s plot of sending troops to stop KMT’s Northern
Expedition; third, to analyze the demands of the cabinet of Japanese warlords after the
Jinan Incident; fourth, to make the public known the wild scheme of Japanese
imperialist; fifth, to explicate the definition of “nationalism”.54 According to this list
53 See “Zhongshuju xingwujiuguochi jinian” (“Central bureau held may 9 national humiliation day memorial”),
Shenbao (1929, May 10). P.6; “Shoudu gejie zuori juxing guoch ijiniandahui” (“Figures from all circles held
national humiliation memorials in capital city yesterday), Zhongyang Ribao (1932, May 10), p.3; “Jinri wujiu
guochi jinian” (“Recent May 9 national humiliation memorials”), Shenbao (1933, May 9) p.8; “Gejie daibiao zuori
juxing wujiu guochi jinian dahui” (“Delegates from all circles held May 9 national humiliation memorials
yesterday”), Shenbao (1934, May 10). p.10.
54 Zhang, Yan & Sun, Yanjing. (Ed.), (2009).Minguo shiliao congkan, Zhengzhou: Daxiang Chubanshe, p.147.
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of propaganda tasks, there is no doubt that Japan had been constructed as one of the
major “others” or even a “national enemy” by the authorities in order to unify the
whole nation and mobilize the mass.
The efforts of nationalists and later KMT government that made to construct the
“humiliation memory” achieved a considerable success. The reputation of those
imperialist countries, especially the Japan, had decreased drastically. The sense of
humiliation and the hatred towards the Japanese imperialist among the public had been
increasingly intense at that time. Apart from government’s efforts, it is Japanese
military’s invasion of Manchurian, the north-east part of China, on 18th September
1931, that made all Chinese people realized that there must be a war between China
and Japanese invaders and it really arouse their patriotic sentiment. In order to
motivate the citizens to prepare for the upcoming war, KMT government began to
attach great importance to national humiliation education in primary and secondary
schools. In 1932, the goal of historic education was revised by the government. The
first goal was to grasp Chinese national history, especially the glories we enjoyed in
the past and the humiliations we suffered recently. Aiming at inspiring the thinking of
“cleansing the national humiliation”, student must be told the reasons why we Chinese
was invaded by the imperialist countries.55
The textbook of primary schools in 1933 added the content like “history of the
memorial of national humiliation”. One of the paragraphs told the students:
At present, our unfortunate family has encountered a great number of robbers, who have been
snatching our possessions, killing our families. Cannot you hear? There are plenty of weeping
inside our family every day! In recent decades, we have been subjecting to imperialists
aggressions and massacres all the time. Every day has become our national humiliation day…
[E]specially in the recent two years, the atrocious Japanese has not only grabbed our countless
lands and possessions, but also killed tens of thousands of our fellows.56
55 Liu, Yingjie. (Ed.) (2001). Zhongguo Jiaoyu Dashidian (1840-1949). Hangzhou: Zhejiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe, pp.
339-340.
56 Gu, Lvtong (1933). Guochi jinianshi (History of the memorial of national humiliation), Shanghai: Xinzhongguo
Chubanshe, pp.2-4.
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At the end of the paragraph, students were told to remember the atrocious Japanese, the
robber, and always think about revenge.
Differing from the previous textbooks in Beiyang-governing era, which called Japan in
a neutral way, for example, “atrocious Japanese” (Baori) began to be used to call Japan
during KMT period. In addition, the proportion of the contents, which regarding the
invasions of those imperialist countries, had changed. Although the first and second
Opium War remiand important, atrocities of Japanese military had become the
highlight of the textbooks, for example, the first Sino-Japanese War, the unequal
treaty—“Twenty-one Demands” and Japanese’s invasion of the northeast China, etc.57
All in all, the victim narrative was a dominant theme in the pre-1949 era. During this
period, the origins and popularization of “national humiliation” discourse was
accompanied with the construction of a proper national identity, which was out of the
clashes among the former Qing dynasty,warlords, and foreign countries.58 In fact,
Chinese sense of humiliation was not brought by Japanese imperialist solely. However,
the first establishment of the “National Humiliation Day”, when Japan issued the
ultimatum of the “Twenty-one Demand” on Chinese government, made Japan become
a representative of those foreign imperialists. Furthermore, along with Japanese
military’s continuing steps of invading China, KMT government also took strong
actions to construct Japan as a “national enemy” to motivate the population to prepare
for the upcoming war. To sum up, the establishment of “National Humiliation Day” in
the first half of 1900s and the upsurge of anti-Japanese sentiment associated with the
intensification of national humiliation discourse together had contributed to shape
Chinese’s understanding of “humiliation” until Chinese Communist Party took over
the country in 1949. In this sense, to most Chinese people at that time, Japan was the
representative of the word “humiliation”.
57 Ibid.
58 Callahan, WilliamA. (2006). “History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China,”
Critical Asian Studies, 38(02), p.179.
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The Absence of Victim Narrative in China’s Civil
Society (1950s-1980s)
From 1949 to the end of 1980s, victim discourse had totally disappeared in Chinese
civil society. There was no new book published with the topic of “national
humiliation” from 1947 to 1990.59 In accordance with the absence of victim narrative,
the official emphasis on “atrocious Japan” had once disappeared in Chinese society
during Mao’s era. Although victim discourse was not the theme in the first four
decades in People’s Republic of China like before, situations in Maoist era (1949-
1976) and Deng’s era before 1989 were completely different. From Mao’s perspective,
China is a “victor” rather than a “victim”. Chinese people’s “Century of National
Humiliation” had been cleansed by the achievements of defeating the Japanese
invaders in 1945 and founding its own nation in 1949. The assertion of the CCP’s role
as an architect of Japan’s surrender had dominated the whole country. From the late-
1970s to the late-1980s neither “victor narrative” nor “victim narrative” were used by
the government to give the nation a new identity. Based on the “reform and opening
up” policy, Chinese government had gradually changed from an idealist to a pragmatist
whose top task was the development of the domestic economy. In this sense, Japan
was neither a friend nor a foe.
Victor discourse in the Maoist era and Japan as a “friend” (1949-the
late 1970s)
It is the time that Mao Zedong stood on the Tiananmen Platform and told his people
“Our Chinese has stood up”, which symbolizes the end of the narrative of “Century of
National Humiliation”. Many scholars believe that the victim discourse disappeared in
59 According to the data from National Library of China. Quote in: Callahan, William A. (2006). “History, identity,
and security: Producing and consuming nationalism in China,” Critical Asian Studies, 38(2), p.186.
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Maoist years. Gries argues that victor narratives rather than victim narratives
dominated China’s civil society in Mao’s period. In this scenario, the national
independence was exclusively attributed to Chinese Communist Party. Its victory over
the War of Resistance against Japan and the Civil War against KMT was considered as
an imperative part of official historical narratives.60 According to Tyrene White,
instead of fighting back to the imperialists, “mass mobilization” among classes in civil
society was the main characteristic of the Maoist era.61 Zhao Suisheng in his article
argues that there was a salience of nationalism from 1950s to the early 1970s because
of the promotion of official ideology—Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought.62 Parks Coble points out that though Chinese people had just suffered from
the war, “Maoist China lacked memorials, museums, and historical writing and
literature devoted to the war”63. Accompanied by the vanishing victim narrative, the
emphasis on the “atrocious Japan” had once disappeared in Chinese society during
Mao’s era. In the following part, this article first tend to examine why the narrative of
national humiliation had disappeared during Mao’s era, and to be more specific, why
the Communist government chose to avoid the sensitive “history issue” towards Japan
at that time? Then, if the Communist government did not want to underscore the “bad”
history between China and Japan, how it described the War of anti-Japanese without
victim narrative? What kind of role did the Japanese assume in Mao’s narrative?
In order to answer the first question that why there was oblivion of the War of
Resistance against Japan during first few decades of new Communist China, it would
be better to understand the new regime’s position inside and outside. Domestically, the
end of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) did not leave a peaceful nor stable
circumstance in China. In contrast, a civil war between the CCP and the KMT began in
1945 immediately. After five-year fighting, the Communist Party finally defeated the
60 Gries, Peter H. (2005). “A Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Nationalism: The People, Their Pasts, and Their
Passions,”World Economics and Politics, 11, pp.45-46.
61 White, Tyrene. (1990). “Post Revolutionary Mobilization in China: The One-Child Policy Reconsidered,”
World Politics, 43(1), p.55.
62 Zhao, Suisheng. (1998). “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen
China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31(3), p.288.
63 Coble, Parks M. (2007). “China's ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945,”
The China Quarterly, 190, p.395.
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Kuomin Party and then found the People Republic of China in 1949. Although the
Communist Party established a new regime in mainland, the threat from the Taiwan-
based KMT’ Republic of China regime was still CCP’s top concern. In this sense, the
KMT rather than the Japanese military assumed the “other” character when
Communist authority tried to construct a proper national identity in a new age.
Similarly, instead of the War of Anti-Japanese, the Civil War between KMT and CCP
had become the Communist China’s daily narrative. According to CCP’s new narrative
of history, it is the party itself led the whole country to overcome the difficulties and
defeat the Japanese military, the efforts of the KMT troops was neglected deliberately.
Chiang Kai-shek, the top leader of the Republic of China, was described as a
representative of Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie, as well as a “little brother” of the
US imperialism by the Communist government. Due to Chiang Kai-shek and his
party’s nature, they were reluctant to fight against the Japanese invaders, and even
“right up to 1944, Chiang Kai-shek never ceased his clandestine attempts to make
peace with Japan.”64 Compared with Chiang Kai-shek and his party, Japanese military
was less important in Communists’ narrative of history. Mao had criticized Chiang
“adopted the reactionary policy of passivity and resisting Japan but actually opposing
the Communists and the people.”65 According to this critique, though Japan was the
common enemy of both CCP and KMT troops, the negative role of KMT rather than
Japanese military was stressed by the Communist Party at that time. Internationally,
apart from KMT, the US imperialist were another “enemy” for the new Communist
regime. After 1949, another task of the CCP government was to counterbalance the US
imperialist because of its supporting to the KMT-led Republic of China in Taiwan
since the outbreak of the Korean War (1951).
Being conscious of great threats from the KMT-led regime and its US ally, the
Communist government determined to anchor new China’s national identity to
communist ideology by stressing and defining the fundamental distinction between
64 Mao Tse-tung (Zedong). (1954). The Policies, Measures, and Perspectives of Combating Japanese Invasion,
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. i-ii.
65 Ibid.
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Communist China and the Capitalists “others”.66 During Maoist period, social classed
rather than the nation-state was considered as the primary category to define identity
and security. From Mao’s perspective, the nation-state was no longer a primary actor in
the anarchic international structure. Mao argued “class differentiation transcends
national boundaries, and opposing classes organize themselves based on transnational
class identity and interests.”67 Based on Mao’s class-based viewpoint, it is not difficult
to identify two “Others” of the Communist China. First, KMT and the landlord class it
represented were the internal “Others”, and second, the US imperialist, who assumed
the leadership in the Capitalist Camp, was the external “others”. As regard to
Communist China’s international position, it should be noticed that the communist
China was not acknowledged by the international society as a legitimate regime until
the year 1971. Facing the severe environments both inside and outside, the CCP
authority had to take great efforts to magnify its role in national resistance war against
Japan, condemned the role of KMT and US imperialist and downplayed the role of the
Japanese military.
During the Communist Party first decades in power, KMT regime and the US
imperialist had played the role as CCP’s primary “enemies”. However, here are natural
questions: what kind of role Japan assumed in PRC’s narrative? How the communist
regime saw the second Sino-Japanese War? In order to answer the first question, it tries
to quote one of the public speeches of Mao in 1954 when met with Burma’s premier.
On this speech, Mao said “At present, Japan’s position also changed, it has become a
semi-occupied country, which is in his difficulty. Chinese people have no longer hatred
Japan that much, instead, we hold a friendly attitude towards Japan.”68 It is clear that
the China’s attitude towards Japan in the post-war era had changed dramatically.As we
analyzed in the previous section, Japan was considered as a major “national enemy”
who exerted humiliations on the Chinese. However, to Mao’s mind, Japan was no
66 Mitter, Rana. (2000). “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War
of Resistance Museum,” 1987-1997, The China Quarterly 161(1), p.283.
67 Zhang, Tiejun. (2004). “Self-Identity Construction of the Present China,” Comparative Strategy, 23(3): 281-301.
68 Zhong, Zhicheng. (2006).Weile Shijie Gengmeihao: Jiang Zemin Chufang Shiji (Aiming at a more beautiful
world), Beijing: ShijieZhishi Chubanshe, p.17.
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longer a previous invader, and it should be divided into two segments: Japanese
military and Japanese people. Even though Japanese military had brought disasters to
Chinese people, ordinary Japanese people were innocent, and to some extent, they
were also the victim of Japanese militarists. Therefore, based on this division, Mao
argued that Chinese people should treat Japanese people as our friend. A similar tone
was also given by Premier Zhou Enlai, when he met with Japanese delegates in 1953:
The aggression of Japanese military not only made Chinese and Far East people had suffered
considerable loss, but also brought an unparalleled disaster to Japanese people… Now
Japanese people are struggling for national independence and fighting against re-militarism.
Chinese people respect it. 69
One year later, when Premier Zhou Enlai met with Japanese Diet members, he first
expressed CCP’s attitude towards the war. He said that though the history of the
past 60 years of bilateral relations between China and Japan was not good, it was
the thing of the past. Therefore, China and Japan should hope for the future but not
the past. He also emphasized that China and Japan had thousand years of good
relations, our generation just lived in the worst time unfortunately.70
In Maoist China, the government defined a clear line between mass Japanese people
and a small handful of Japanese militarists. The former one was Chinese people’s
friends, who also suffered a lot due to the militarists, while the latter one was the
only actor that should be blamed for the crime of the war. China’s people/militarists
division echoed Japanese conservative groups’ “myth of the military clique” which
“blamed a small group of military leaders for launching the war and asserted that
the Japanese people were peace-loving, innocent victims of the war.”71 In addition,
this division was also compatible with Mao’s class-based logic, the primary method
to define national identity and security in Maoist China. In accordance with the
class-based ideology, the anti-Japanese war was considered as an integral part of the
69
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struggle against the fascism at a global level.72
According to above Chinese top leaders’ speeches, Japan, which was constituted of
peaceful Japanese people, was no longer China’s “enemy” but friend in Maoist China.
As for the reason why the new communist government abolished negative narrative
towards Japan in pre-1949 age, it was largely linked to the threats from the KMT and
its US imperialist ally. Located in a severe environment, Beijing intended to draw
Japan into its Communist Camp. If China could unite with Japanese Communist party
as well as Japanese people to build a revolutionary frontline, it would erode the US-
led Camp against China.73 To meet this need, Chinese Communist government
started “people’s diplomacy” in allusion to Japan since the 1950s, aiming at
undercutting Japan’s security alliance with the United States.74 By the late 1960s,
international structure had changed dramatically with deteriorative Sino-Soviet
relations and ameliorative Sino-US relations. These external changes required
Chinese government to seek ways to collaborate with Japan to balance against the
Soviet hegemony. Since the 1960s, Japan was topping a high strategic position in
Mao’s foreign policy. From Mao’s perspective, keeping a good relationship with
Japan would “contribute to the struggle against the US and the Soviet hegemonies,
especially Soviet revisionism.”75 This could also be reflected in the beginning of the
bilateral negotiation of diplomatic normalization in 1972. Overall, during the Maoist
era, according to national external strategy, the narrative of the “atrocious Japan” had
diapered.
With its powerful control of the social discourses, the CCP had easily institutionalized
a new narrative of the war and history regarded as the exclusive national memory. The
assertion of the Chinese Communist Party’s role played as the architect of Japan’s
72 Sneider, Daniel. (2013). “Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and Japan,”
Asia-Pacific Review 20(1), p.41.
73 Wang, Jisi. (1994). “International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese
Perspective,” Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (Eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New
York: Oxford University Press, pp.482–505.
74 He, Yinan. (2007). “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-
Japanese,” History and Memory, 19(2), p.47.
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Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, p.316.
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surrender had dominated the whole country. Contents of School textbooks, during
Maoist period, were preoccupied with the civil war between CCP and the KMT, but
focused very little on the Sino-Japanese War and Japanese crimes during the wartime.
Moreover, the war, which had been considered as a national humiliation in pre-1949
era, was given the name of “The Great Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese
Aggression” (Weida de Zhongguo Renmin Kangri Zhanzheng) in textbooks to
coincide with the party’s victor narrative.76 Besides, the former named like the
“atrocious Japanese” (Baori) was replaced by the “Japanese imperialism” (Riben
diguo zhuyi), “Japanese military” (Rijun) or the “Japanese bandits” (Rikou)77, which
differentiate the small parts of bad Japanese from those of many good ordinary
Japanese people.
Later during the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), history education practically
halted in schools throughout the entire country. “Red Classics”—the Revolutionary
Operas (Yangbanxi) had dominated the social culture fields and served as the primary
way to portrait the war and the Japanese for ten years long. With the very limited
resources of entertainment and education at that time, the eight Model Operas nearly
dominated the performance on stages, contents in radio broadcasts, and films on
screens of the whole country. No exaggeration to say, they were the only available
public entertainment for Chinese people, leading to a unique phenomenon in Mao’s
China “Eight hundred million people watched eight shows”.78 Similar to the textbooks,
Revolutionary Operas did not pay much attention to the topic of Japanese war crime.
The anti-Japanese war just served under an ambiguous background, in which the
Japanese army will definitely be defeated by the communist heroes at the end of those
Operas. The reason to engineer such operas was to glorify the Chinese Communist
Party, as well as the bravery of Chinese common people. Since the content of the
traditional Peking Opera was no longer suitable to the new theme of the Maoist
76 He, Yinan. (2007). “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-
Japanese,” History and Memory, 19(2), p.48.
77 Ibid.
78 Clark, Paul. (2008). The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, p. 2.
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age—class struggle, new contents must be infused into this old form of art.79 There
were eight famous Model Operas during that period, which include: The Legend of the
Red Lantern, Shajiabang, Raid on the White Tiger Regiment, Taking Tiger Mountain
by Strategy, Ode of the Dragon River, Red Detachment of Women, The White-Haired
Girl and On the Dock. All these Operas were created to add the big significance to
Chinese Communist Party and its army, while reduce importance of enemies.
Moreover, among the above eight operas, only two of them were created based on the
Second Sino-Japanese War, and five of the rest were derived from the domestic
conflicts between different classes, the last one originated from the Korean War. In this
sense, KMT, as a representative of the landlord class, along with its American ally still
depicted as the perceived “enemy” during the revolutionary period, and the
characteristic of Japanese soldiers as same as commanders were really cut-and-dried.
To sum up, in Maoist era, national humiliation discourse had totally disappeared from
public eyes. Victor narrative rather than victim narrative had dominated China’s civil
society. In this scenario, the national independence was exclusively attributed to the
Chinese Communist Party, it is the party itself which led the whole country to
overcome the difficulties and defeat the Japanese military. Although there was no
“national humiliation” at that time, two main “others”—KMT regime and the US,
were defined hostile by the new communist regime. As a result, Japan’s role as the
“national enemy” was replaced by KMT and the US. According to Chinese top
leaders’ speeches in Maoist China, Japan was no longer China’s “enemy” but a friend,
and it was mostly due to the threats from KMT and the US imperialist. Being
conscious of great threats of the KMT-led regime and its US ally, the Communist
government determined to anchor new China’s national identity to communist
ideology and intended to ally Japan into its Communist Camp. In this sense, the mass
good Japanese people were separated from those few bad militarists. To Mao’s mind,
79 Mao characterized the traditional Peking Opera by “emperors, kings, generals, chancellors, wits, and beauties”
(diwang jiangxiang caizi jiaren). Chen, Jin (1997), “Mao Zedong yu jingju gaige” (“Mao Zengdong and Peking
Opera pevolution”), Dangshi tiandi, 6, p.25.
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ordinary Japanese were also took used by Japanese militarists. Therefore, based on this
division, Mao argued that Chinese people should treat Japanese people as friends.
A pragmatic China and Japan as a “partner” (1970s-1980s)
After Mao’s era, from the late-1970s to the late-1980s, neither “victor narrative” nor
“victim narrative” were emphasized by the government to construct China’s national
identity. Looking back to this period, it is a transitional period from Mao’s “victor
narrative” to the “victim narrative” started in early-1990s. During the first decades
after Maoist era, Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic philosophy had dominated the internal
society. According to the implement of Deng’s “reform and opening up” policy,
Chinese government had gradually changed from an idealist to a pragmatist. The party,
at that time, tried to get rid of the class-based ideology and made a sharp turnaround of
its relationship with others in the world, which of course includes its adjacent
neighbor—Japan. Ten-year Cultural Revolution had impoverished the country
thoroughly; thus China’s return to engagement in international society was driven by
domestic reactions against this extreme activity.80 In 1977, the year after the end of the
Cultural Revolution, China’s Gross Productive Product (GDP) was just around 172
billion dollars, which merely accounted for 8.6% of American GDP.81 This reality
pushed Deng to apply his pragmatic philosophy to China. One of his most famous
slogans is: “It does not matter whether the cat is black or yellow, as long as it catches
mice.”82 It means that consequences rather than methods or the process matters most
important. To be more specific, in order to develop the domestic economy, China
would overlook ideological factors intentionally when extend cooperation with other
countries in economic area. Apart from the internal factors, external environment
80 Buzan, Barry. (2010). “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics.3, p.12.
81 Statistics are from World DataBank, the World Band. Retrieved June 3, 2013 from:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
82
Deng Xiaoping wenxuan diyijuan(Deng Xiaoping, selected works Vol.1), Zenme huifu nongye shenchan (How
to restore agricultural production), speech of 7 July 1962. Retrieved on December 27, 2013, from:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2011-04/24/c_121341795.htm.
35
changed with the shrink of the Soviet Union’s capability also enabled China to make
this transformation.
The change of China’s national identity required Chinese government to strengthen the
Sino-Japanese relations in a more practical way. On August 12th, 1978, after six-year
long fifteen-ground negotiation, the representatives of China and Japan finally signed
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and two months later, Deng Xiaoping, Vice
Premier of the P.R.C, was invited to visit Japan officially. On October 23rd, 1978, the
treaty went into effect ultimately. Deng considered this treaty as “it not only
summarizes our previous relations in the matter of fact, but also at legal and political
level, more importantly, it further confirms the value of developing the friendly
relations between the two countries”, “China and Japan should keep this friendly
relation form generations to generations”.83 After his visit, a modernized Japan had
deeply rooted into Deng’s mind. During that period, Japan was considered as a
successful Asian case in modernization. Thus, Japanese style “offered lessons for
China’s struggle to shed traditional socialism without falling prey to individual
capitalism.”84 After getting rid of the Mao’s class struggle approach and the socialist
model of developing, China governed under Deng found that Japan’s state-managing
economy could be brought into in China.85 Therefore, for Chinese government, Japan
was neither a real friend nor an enemy, but an important cooperative partner as well as
a study model to China in its process of economic development. Actually, after over
ten years’ communication and cooperation with Japan, this view was genuinely
accepted by the public. A national survey conducted in 1989 demonstrated that the
exchange of science and technology and economic cooperation were the most
important parts of Sino-Japanese relations in the mind of Chinese people.86 In the
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context of “reform and open door” policy, Japan, to a great extent, was taken as a role
model for China’s development.
According to some articles, which focus on Sino-Japanese relations, China’s attitude
and narrative towards Japan had already changed in the early-1980s.87 Among them,
He argues that the controversy of Japanese textbook publicized in 1982 is a good
example to reveal the internal divergence of the party between the reformists and the
conservatives. This inner pressure led Deng has to compromise with the conservatives
with regard to this textbook issue. As a result, Japan has become an immoral “others”
again in the party’s discourse since then.88 Coble points out that the waning appeal to
ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the changing attitude of Taiwan’s strategic
position induced a “New Remembering” of the Sino-Japanese war from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s.89 However, in Coble’s article, there is insufficient evidence
to show that the second Sino-Japanese War reappeared again in public at that time.90
Differing form Coble, Reilly argues, it is the change of the external factors including
China’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the expanding military capacity of
Japan that brought the wartime suffering back to the national discourse of history.91
This thesis keeps the opinion of that it was not until the happening of Tiananmen
Incident in 1989 did the Communist China change its narrative on the “history issues”
between China and Japan. This argument can be supported by the government’s low-
key reactions to the controversy about Japanese textbook in 1982 and three Japanese
Premier’s worship at the Yasukuni Shrine in 1975, 1982 and 1985 respectively.92
The “Japanese Textbook Incident” was a consequence of long-term conflict between
87 He, Yinan. (2007). “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-
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the progressive academic establishment and the right-leaning conservative
establishment.93 After Japan’s surrender, the narrative of the history was dominated
by those progressive scholars for quite a long time until launching of “Biased
Textbook Campaign” (Henkō Kyōkasho Kyanpein)94 by the conservative
establishment around 1980. By criticizing the existing communist-oriented view in
textbooks as well as an absence of the Japanese view of History, Education Minister
Tanaka Tatsuo reminded those textbook editors to attach more importance on
patriotism and “soften their approach to Japan’s excesses” during the wartime.95 In
the middle-1982, the Ministry of Education (MoE) was reported to issue a statement
of textbook “whitewashing”. For example, the ambiguous description of the Nanjing
Massacre in the Nihon Shoseki textbook, it only mentioned “killings of numerous
civilians including women and children in the “chaos of occupation” without the
raping crime.96 Although Chinese government had given a formal protest to Tokyo,
there is still a phenomenon that Beijing did not respond to this textbook incident
immediately. The state-run newspaper Renminribao (People’s Daily) started to Lash
out Japanese government’s provocative behavior on 20th July 1982 after one-month
waiting.97
This subtle delay in some degree showed that Deng and his fellows of reformism
worried about destroying the recovering Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, Chinese
government did not revise its own textbook as a counterattack to Japan.98 When
Japanese Premier Suzuki Zenko visited China on 28th September 1982, Deng Xiaoping
just expressed his concern on Japanese new trend of militarism. Deng said “there must
be other issues like this textbook controversy in the future between China and
93 Bukh, Alexander. (2007). “Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and
Victimization,” Asian Survey, 47(5), p.684.
94 He, Yinan. (2007). “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-
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95 Rose, Caroline. (1998). Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-
Making, New York: Routledge, pp. 68–71.
96 Kodama, Chugaku, p. 258. Quoted from: Bukh, Alexander. (2007), “Japan's History Textbooks Debate:
National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization,” Asian Survey, 47(5), p.694.
97 Retrieved on November 27, 2013, from: http://www.nongli.com/today/todayxx-2622.htm.
98 There is a huge difference between the government reactions to the textbook controversy between China and
Japan occurred in 1982 and the early 2000 respectively. For the latter one, the government reacted by revising
Chinese history textbook to replace the 1990s version.
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Japan…With regard to Sino-Japanese political relations, we hope you and your
government as well as Japanese future governments to be wary of militarism.”99 As a
result, the controversy about Japanese textbook only received a “warning” from
Chinese government of no any anti-Japanese reactions from the public, which is in
contrast with a similar “textbook controversy” between China and Japan occurred in
2005. Similarly, Japanese Premier’s worship at the Yasukuni Shrine in 1970s and
1980s neither triggered a high-profile wide critique from the government, nor caused
large scale of reactions of anti-Japanese nationalism. In October 1985, just two
months after Japanese Premier Nakasone Yasuhiro’s worship at Yasukuni Shrine,
People’s daily used a full-page article to give an optimistic view on Sino-Japanese
relations.100
Due to China’s “reform and opening-up” policy, the era of 1980s witnessed a peak of
Sino-Japanese relationship development in aspects of politic, economic and culture,
especially in politic. Regard to political relations, top-level visits between Chinese and
Japanese leaders became more frequent during this period. The most distinctive feature
of Sino-Japanese relations in 1980s was that top leaders in both China and Japan had
realized the significant meaning of establishing a cooperative and reciprocal bilateral
relation for each side. As a result, because of the efforts made by the high-level
politicians, a kind Sino-Japanese relation could be reflected by increasing frequent
visits of political exchange.
After signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, Japanese Premier Ohira
Masayoshi visited China In December 1979 before long. During this diplomatic visit,
Premier Ohira agreed with cooperation toward China on six financial programs for its
demand, and decided to provide Chinese government with 3,009 billion yen’s loan.101
The visit of Ohira started a boom of top-level exchange visits between these two
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countries. The following table shows all visits between leaders of China and Japan
from 1978 to 2013.102 According to the table, there were eleven times top-level visits
paid by Chinese and Japanese leaders during the period from 1978 to 1989. Official
top-level visits during these fifteen years account for nearly half of total visit in two
countries throughout their whole diplomatic history from 1978 to 2013.103 These
frequent diplomatic visits show that the communication channel for top-level
politicians was unblocked. Good relationship between China and Japan not only
determined by the number of top-level political visits, but also by the themes of the
meetings between two sides. When Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang paid a visit to Japan
in May 1982, “Three Principle of Sino-Japanese Relations”— items to be peaceful and
friendly, mutually beneficial and long-term stable, were raised to confirm and promote
the bilateral relations.
Year Japanese leader’s visits to China Chinese leader’s visits to Japan
1979 5th December, Premier Ohira
Masayoshi visited China.104
6th February, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
had a brief visit to Japan on his way back
China from the US.
1980 27th May, Premier Hua Guofeng visited
Japan. 105
1982 26th September
Premier Suzuki Zenko visited China.
31st May,
Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Japan.106
1983 23rd November, President Hu Yaobang
visited Japan.107
1984 23rd March, Premier Nakasone
Yasuhiro visited China.108
1985 21stApril, Peng Zhen, Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, visited Japan.
102 Summarized from the data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, retrieved on
November 21, 2013, from:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/gjhdq_603914/gj_603916/yz_603918/1206_604546/sbgx_604550/
103 Since 1978, there are totally 23 times of top-level visits between China and Japan. See table 1.
104 During this visit, Japan provided China with the first government loan.
105 It is the first time Chinese Premier visit Japan. Hua also participated in the funeral of Premier Ohira Masayoshi
on 8th July the same year.
106 Zhao raised the “Three Principle of Sino-Japanese relations” during his visit.
107 During this visit, Hu confirmed the “Four Principle of Sino-Japanese relations” with Japanese premier
Nakasone Yasuhiro, and decided to build “China-Japan Friendship Committee for the 21st Century”.
108 Japan provided China with the second government loan.
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In economic aspect, China-Japan relations on trade had stepped into a new phase
from1978. In 1981, just two years after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations,
the total trading amount between China and Japan had increased from 4.8 billion
dollars to 10.3 billion dollars. In 1985, Japan had become largest trading partner of
China with trade volume of nearly 20 billion-dollar, more specifically, 24% of gross
import and 30% of gross export of China were from the trading with Japan.112 The
bilateral trade volume had reached 25.4 billion dollars in 1992.113 Apart from the
increasing trading volume between China and Japan, good economic relations between
China and Japan could also be reflected by Japanese government’s ODA (Official
1986 8th November, Premier Nakasone
Yasuhiro’s second visit to China.
1988 25thAugust, Premier Takeshita
Noboru visit China.109
1989 12thApril, Premier Li Peng visited Japan.
1991 10thAugust, Premier Kaifu Toshiki
visit China.110
1992 23rd October, Emperor Akihito
visited China.111
6thApril, President Jiang Zemin visited
Japan.
1994 19th March, Japanese Premier
Hosokawa Morihiro visited China.
23rd February, Premier Zhu Rongji visited
Japan.
1995 2nd May, Japanese Premier
Murayama Tomiichi visited China.
1998 25th November, Premier Jiang Zemin visited
Japan.
1999 8th July, Japanese Premier Obuchi
Keizo visited China.
2000 12th October, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji
visited Japan.
2006 8th October, Japanese PremierAbe
Shinzo visited China.
2007 11thApril, PremierWen Jiabao visited Japan.
2008 6th June, President Hu Jintao visited Japan.
109 During this visit, Japan provided China with the third government loan.
110 He is the first foreign leader visited China after 1989 incident.
111 It is the first and only time that Japanese emperor visited China.
112 Huang, Zemin. (1997). “Xunsu fazhan de zhongri maoyi guanxi” (“Rapid development of Sino-Japanese trade
relations”), International Survey, 4, p.11-12.
113 Ibid.
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Development Assistance) to China. During visit paid by Japanese Premier Ohira
Masayoshi’s in 1979, Japan decided to provide China with 3,309 billion yen’s
government loan from 1979 to 1983, which opened the prelude of Japanese
government ODA to Chinese government. Since then, the ODA had been an integral
part of bilateral economic cooperation between China and Japan, and even a symbol of
one friendly Sino-Japanese relationship until the end of it in 2008. Overall, there are
four installments of ODA from Japan to China, and three of them were signed during
this honeymoon.114
In terms of cultural relations, no matter what kind of exchange between China and
Japan, government or non-government, would afford a great amount of opportunity to
develop in 1980s based on good political and economic relations. On December 6th,
1979, China and Japan signed a cultural exchange agreement, which propelled Sino-
Japanese cultural communication to a higher level. This agreement encouraged both
sides to cooperate in the following fields: academic exchanges, education, joint
researches, cultural activities, media and publication.115 In the academic field, the
number of Chinese delegations reached 250 only in the year of 1981.116 Up to 1991,
the numbers of mutual visits between the two countries had reached 540 thousand,
which was 55 times to the number in 1972 when China and Japan normalizing their
bilateral relations.117 Meanwhile, there had been 127 couples of sister cities between
China and Japan until 1991, which account more than half of the total amount of Sino-
114 The first installment ODA (1979-1983) was promised by Premier Ohira Masayoshi when he visited China in
1979. This 3,309 billion yen’s government loan included 2,009 billion yen’s program loan, which mainly focus on
the construction of transportation and electrical power, and the other 1,300 billion yen’s commodity loan used for
other programs. The second installment ODA (1984-1989) was promised during the term of office of Premier
Suzuki Zenko’s. The second ODA from Japan provided China with 4,700 billion yen’s government loan, which
covered 16 programs. The third installment ODA (1990-1995) was confirmed during Premier Takeshita Noboru’s
visit to China in 1988. The third Japanese ODA offered China 8,100 billion yen’s on 42 constructive programs,
which includes: electrical power, railways, ports, communications, urban infrastructure, etc. (See Cheng,
Yongming& Shi, Baoqi. (2005). Zhongri jingmao guanxi liushimian (Sino-Japanese Economic and Trade relations
in 60 Years), Tianjin: Tianjin Sehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe, pp.320-321.)
115 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he riben zhengfu weicujin wenhua jiaoliu de xieding” (“Agreements between
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116 Lin, Delian. (1990). Dangdai zhongri guanxishi (Contemporary relations between China and Japan), Beijing:
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117 Huang, Dahui. (2008). “Zhongguo gaige kaifang sanshinian yu zhongri guanxi” (“30 Years of development in
Sino-Japanese relations”), Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu, 11, p.17.
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Japanese sister cities at present.118 It is also worth mentioning that 3,000 Japanese
youth delegates were invited by Chinese government in 1984.119 This is the largest and
the largest-scale and the most influential social exchange led by the government in
Sino-Japanese history.
During this period, achievements of good relationship between China and Japan
enjoyed both by governments and ordinary people. Since the normalization of
diplomatic relations, the public views on each other had been heading positive side
until the early-1990s. A public survey conducted by a shanghai Journal in 1978
showed that among 2,500 Chinese people in forty cities, Japan enjoyed the title as the
most welcomed country with 31.4% of the respondents’ supports, which was nearly
doubles the figure of the no.2—Western Europe. In contrast, the US and the Soviet
Union were the most unpopular countries in China.120 A similar conclusion was given
by a joint survey conducted by Ribenwentiziliao and Yomiuri shimbun in May, 1989
before Tiananmen Incident. According to this survey, over half of the respondents on
both sides hold a positive view on Sino-Japanese relations, and only 9.2% of Chinese
respondents and 11.6% of Japanese respondents considered the relations are bad.
Regard to the prospect of the bilateral relations, 88.5% of Chinese respondents hold
an optimistic view on bilateral relations and believed that China and Japan should be
closer in next decennium. Besides, over 50% respondents got a feel of affinity with
Japan, while in adverse figure of Japan, it was over 70%. The most impressive result
of this joint survey was the part about “history issue”. When asked the question like
“Do you think Japan had reproached itself for its past aggression”, 56.7% of Chinese
people chose to answer “yes”, which was higher than Japanese side (54.6%).121
118 The total number of sister cites between China and Japan are 251till 2013. Retrieved on December 3, 2013,
from: http://japan.people.com.cn/95917/8293960.html
119 On National day of that year, all these Japanese delegates were given a sit on the viewing standing of
Tiananmen to see military parade, which was the first time since the end of Cultural Revolution. After the parade,
there was a dancing ball held in Tiananmen Square for Chinese and Japanese young people until midnight. See
“Jiyi 1984: Zhongri qingnian Tiananmen gongwu de rizi” (“Remembrance 1984: the days of Chinese and Japanese
youth dancing together in Tiananmen”), (May 5,2008), Dongfang Zaobao. Retrieved on Decenmber 3 ,2013 from:
http://epaper.dfdaily.com/dfzb/html/2008-05/05/content_54929.htm.
120 Rozman, Gilbert. (2002). “China’s changing images of Japan, 1989-2001: the struggle to balance partnership
and rivalry,” Internal Relations of Asian-Pacific, 2(1), p.98.
121 Jiang, Lifeng. (1989). “Zhongri lianhe jinxing de shehui yulun diaocha shuomingle shenme” (“What can the
result of the joint survey of public views tell us”), Riben wenti ziliao, 2: 22-25.
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According to this survey, as least, till the end of 1980s, it can be concluded that the
majority of Chinese people had forgiven Japan for what it did during the wartime, and
most Japanese people still felt guilty to China so that the impact of “history issue” to
Sino-Japanese relations was weakening. All in all, During the 1980s, positive views on
each other reached its peak in China-Japan post-war history, which means that Japan
was no longer the “national enemy” but had become a reliable partner to China in this
period.
To sum up, from the late-1970s to the late-1980s, China was neither a “victor” nor a
“victim”, but a pragmatic actor who dedicated to get rid of the class-based ideology
and focus on domestic economic development. It made a sharp turnaround in its
relationship with other countries in the world. The change of China’s national identity
required Chinese government to develop the Sino-Japanese relations from a more
practical perspective. Japan, at that time, was neither a real friend nor an enemy, but an
important cooperative partner as well as a study model for China in its process of
economic development. In order to maintain a good relations with Japan, Chinese
government kept a low profile responding to some sensitive history issues, for
example, the controversy about Japanese textbook in 1982 and three Japanese
Premier’s worship at the Yasukuni Shrine during this time. Because of government’s
moderate attitudes toward “history issues” and its pragmatic approach to Japan, the
1980s saw a peak of Sino-Japanese relationship. Besides, good relationship between
China and Japan was also shared by ordinary people of these two countries. In 1980s,
Chinese people’s views on Japan also reached its peak. Based on the attitudes of both
Chinese government and the public towards Japan, the “bad history” seemed to be no
longer an obstacle of the future development of Sino-Japanese relation. Yet, when the
spring of 1989 came, everything was changed.
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The Revival of Victim Discourse since the Late-1980s
On the eve of 1990s, the CCP was facing a huge “ideology vacuum”. When Deng’s
reform encountered a hardship of high inflation and higher unemployment rate, his
pragmatic philosophy lost its supporting drive. Since the old ideology in Mao’s era
had been replaced by Deng’s practical slogans, there was no dominant ideology inside
the country can be used to inspire people effectively overcoming the hard time. This
“ideology vacuum” later gave rise to the well-known anti-government demonstration
in Tiananmen Square. After Tiananmen Incident, Deng began to readjust his previous
strategy, and decided to give more emphasis on ideological education. Soon after in
1989, the “Patriotic Education Campaign” was launched by the Party. Since then, the
“Century of National Humiliation” discourse thus was put up again by the
government to legitimize its rules and overcome the regime crises. It should be noted
that the initial objective of this “Patriotic Education Campaign” was to unify the
nation rather than create a new indignation towards Japan. However, in order to make
this campaign more effective, a typical “other” was needed to encourage Chinese
strong patriotism and nationalism. Since “the horrors of the Japanese invasion were
painfully clear”,122 the emphasis on the war history had made Japan regain its role as
a “national enemy” of China. As a result, the patriotic campaign got a success in
stimulating public resonance.
“Patriotic Education Campaign” and a changing image of Japan (since
the early 1990s)
After the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping started the economic reform in China.
In order to eradicate the old ideology in Mao’s era, Deng replaced it with a new
pragmatic one—“to get rich”. Unfortunately, the reform encountered a hardship with
122 Reilly, James. (2011). “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of
Resistance to Japan,”Modern Asian Studies, 45(2), p.471.
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high inflation and higher unemployment rate in the late 1980s. At that moment, since
the old ideology Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought had been replaced by
practical slogans, there was no dominant ideology inside the country to inspire people
effectively overcoming the hard time. The CCP had faced the most severe political
challenge—“three belief crises”123— since 1949. This “ideology vacuum” gave rise to
appearance of western liberal values among Chinese young people in the late 1980,
and then led to the well-known anti-government demonstration in Tiananmen
Square.124 After controversial suppression of the student demonstration, Deng began
to reflect on his previous strategy. He concluded that the biggest mistake of the Party
was that they ignored the importance of ideological education. He admitted that:
I have told foreign guests that, during the last 10 years, our biggest mistake was made in the
field of education, primarily in ideological and political education— not just of students but
of the people in general. We did not tell them enough about the need for the hard struggle,
about what China was like in the old days and what kind of a country it was to become.125
The lesson about “Tiananmen Incident” taught Deng and his successor of country
power; Jiang Zemin that ideological and political education should be indoctrinated
seriously to the younger generation as soon as possible. As Paul Cohen said, after the
Tiananmen Incident, “there was a felt, if unstated, need on the part of the Chinese
government to come up with a new legitimating ideology to burnish the rapidly
dimming luster of the original Marxist-Leninist-Maoist vision. The logical candidate,
was nationalism, to be inculcated via a multifaceted program of patriotic
education.”126 Soon after 1989, the “Patriotic Education Campaign” was launched by
the Party around the whole country. The main content of the patriotic education was
to tell young people the humiliating experience that China has suffered in the fight
123 They are crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the party. See Chen, Jie.
(1995). “The Impact of Reform on the Party and Ideology in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 9: 22-34.
124 Zhao, Suisheng. (1998). “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen
China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(3), pp.288-289.
125
Deng Xiaoping wen xuan disanjuan (Deng Xiaoping, selected works Vol. 3) “Zaijiejian shoudu jieyan budui
junyishang ganbushi de jianghua” (“Address to officers at the rank of general and above in command of the troops
enforcing martial law in Beijing”), speech of 9 June 1989. Retrieved on October 2, 2013,
from:http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2004-08/02/content_5625194.htm.
126 Cohen, Paul A. (2003). China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past, London: Routledge
Curzon, p. 167.
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against West and Japanese invasion. Thus, the “Century of National Humiliation”
discourse thus was rediscovered by the government to legitimize its rules and
overcome the regime crises.
The “Patriotic Education Campaign” was launched by Jiang Zemin in 1991 related
two important official documents. The first one was “Notice about Conducting
Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively
Cultural Relics” (Notice) issued by CCP Central Committee and the second was
“General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary
History and National Conditions” (General Outline) issued by Ministry of Education
respectively.127 The “General Outline” stressed that the patriotic education should be
carried out to all primary and high schools, which includes: make sure that all schools
have a the flag-raising ceremony every week, editing and publishing the patriotic
books and comic books, and conducting the patriotic education with Chinese
humiliating history.128 It deserved noticing that Jiang wrote a letter himself to the
Education Minister to address the urgency of the patriotic education. Jiang said in his
letter, which public in People’s Daily on March 9, 1991 going as that:
We should conduct education on Chinese modern and contemporary history and national
conditions to pupils (even to the kids in kindergarten), middle school students and to the
university students. The education should go from the easy to the difficult, and should be
persistent.129
The introduction of Beijing quickly conveyed to local governments and institutions.
As nearly all of schools in China, from primary level to the highest one, scare under
the control of the central government, it would be efficient for the whole intact system
to implement these two important documents. The “General Outline” particularly
required that all schools should take actions less than three years to follow the
127 Wang, Zheng. (2008). “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory:
Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” International Studies Quarterly, 52, p.789.
128 “Guojia Jiaowei 1991nian Gongzuo Yaodian” (“General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese
Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions”). Retrieved on October 2, 2013, from:
http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_164/200408/3440.html.
129 Ibid.
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instruction and reform the curriculum. In 1994, another official document “Outline on
Implementing Patriotic Education”, which issued by the CCP Central Committee,
symbolized the addition of full-scale implement to patriotic education. This outline
stressed that patriotism is the “spiritual pillar” of all Chinese people, and confirmed
the content of patriotic education, in which historical humiliation education was given
a great importance.130 As Callahan comments, the primary goal of this patriotic
education campaign is “to reeducate the youth (as it was in the past), as to redirect
protest toward the foreigner as an enemy, as an external ‘other’”.131
Since the early 1990, the narrative of the “Century of National Humiliation” has been
emphasized in all aspects, especially the state education system. Many scholars agree
with the argument for the history textbooks play an essential role in constructing and
reproducing national narratives. According to Howard Mehlinger, textbooks are tools
to teach young people “what adults believe they should know about their own culture,
as well as that of other societies.”132 Elie Podeh points out that a national education
system applied as the effect of textbooks should be considered as a primary
instrument for socializing young generation to the dominant values. They are the
“agents of memory” whose tasks were to interpret the “true” common memories
adopted by younger generations, and finally let them accept this shared value for
granted.133 In the scenario of China, the extending of education system and the
adoption of these kind of textbooks should pay more attention because there is only
one set of textbooks authorized by the government. In addition, it deserved to notice
that the content of the uniform college-preparatory examination is based on this set of
textbooks, no one dare use the alternative if they want to pass and even get a good
grade in this crucial examination.
130 “Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gngyao” (“Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education”), Ministry of Education of
the People’s Republic of China, Rednet, 2008. Retrieved ON October 2, 2013, from:
http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2008/06/30/1539945.htm.
131 Callahan, WilliamA. (2006). “History, Identity and Security: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China,”
Critical Asian Studies, 38 (2): 179-208.
132 Mehlinger, Howard D. (1985). “International Textbook Revision: Examples From the United States,”
Internationale Schulbuchforschung, 7, p.287.
133 Podeh, Elie. (2000). “History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of theArab-Israeli
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The new version of Chinese contemporary and modern history textbooks was
published in the early 1990s. The revised textbooks according to the instruction of the
“Patriotic Education Campaign” showed a shifting nature of the narrative in Chinese
history. First, the revised textbooks of Chinese contemporary and modern history start
from the Opium war (1840-1842), which symbolizes the beginning of the “Century of
National Humiliation”. On one hand, in this new kind of version, the history of
suffering starting from those immoral invasions of foreign imperialists was
reemphasized, for example, the War of Resistance of Japanese (1937-1945). On the
other hand, some external conflicts among China and other countries, for example, the
War against Vietnam (1979) was deleted in history textbooks.134 Second, the revised
textbooks divided the wartime into two sections. The first section was about the
confrontation between CCP and KMT while the second part mainly focuses on the
Second Sino-Japanese War. Differing from Mao’s age, in the version of 1990s version,
KMT’s contribution of resistance against Japan was acknowledged. When facing
foreign invaders, CCP and KMT put aside their differences and fought together
against Japanese troops or sometimes on their own ways.
To be more specific, according to this new version, the “other” of the nation has
changed from KMT and the landlord class to the foreign invaders, especially Japan. In
the early 2000s, because of the annual visits made by Japanese Prime Minster
Koizumi’s to the Yasukuni Shrine and the approval of Japanese government about
the use of history textbook edited by right-wing scholars, Chinese government
decided to revise its own history textbook again. By 2004, this latest version had
gradually replaced the 1990s version. This latest one keeps focusing on China’s
victim character in front of the criminal and brutal invader—Japan, and Chinese
Communist Party’s indispensable role in defeating the Japanese.135 Compared to
former versions, it gives Nanjing Massacre more weight throughout narration of
134 According to a public survey in 1987, Vietnam ranked the first in the question of “which country do you think
has posed threat to China’s national security” with 52.7% of support, while Japan only chosen by 18.9% of
Chinese respondents. Jiang, Lifeng. (1989). “Zhongri lianhe jinxing de shehui yulun diaocha shuomingle shenme”
(“What can the result of the joint survey of public views tell us”), Riben wenti ziliao, 2, p.23.
135 Sneider, Daniel. (2013). “Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and Japan,”
Asia-Pacific Review, 20(1), p.41.
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detailed events and usage of pictures to show what happened in Nanjing at that time.
Moreover, after describing this horrible event, it leaves an open discussion for
students: “The rightwing of Japanese tries to deny what Japanese troops had done in
the Nanjing Massacre—the ultimate act of human cruelty—during the Second Sino-
Japanese War. They consider it a sort of normal behaviors in wartime. What do you
think of it?”136 In addition, the teacher’s guide required all teachers in high schools to
pay attentions to the following content:
During the War of Resistance against Japanese, Japanese aggressor troops had committed
countless crimes to Chinese people, which includes slaughter, arson, looting and raping.
Among all the crimes, Nanjing Massacre is the cruelest one committed by the invading
Japanese troops…Apart from Nanjing Massacre, bacteriological Unit 731 of Japanese army
is another one. Unit 731 had not only created biological weapons, but also conducted
vivisections experiments on Chinese soldiers and civilians.137
It finally concludes that the war crimes conducted by the Japanese military can be
seen as bestial crimes against humanity.
The contents of “Patriotic Education Campaign” are not limited in the process of
revising the textbooks, but include various aspects: the promotion of patriotic films,
the emphasis on flag-raising ceremonies, and the establishment of “Patriotic
Education Bases” and museums around the country. In November 1993, the CCP
Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture and the State Education
Commission issued a joint document—“Circular on Carrying out Education in
Patriotism in Primary and Secondary Schools throughout the Country by Films and
Television”. Beijing municipality soon exhibited the show of “100 patriotic education
films”138 recommended by the central government. By 1994, over 95% of primary
and secondary school students in Beijing have been organized to watch those patriotic
136 Ibid. p.48
137
Zhongguo xiandailishi: jiaoshi zhidao (Modern Chinese history: a teacher’s guide), (2002). Beijing: People’s
Education Press.
138 “Wei qingnianren tigong zuihao de jingshen shilian” (“To provide the teenagers with the best manna”),
(October 1, 2004), Renminribao, p.6.
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films.139 In terms of the theme of these patriotic films, Gries argues that “victim
narrative” had dominated a big screen. Through making a contrast of two films: Lin
Zexu (1959) and Opium war (1997), both of them are about the First Opium War
(1840-1842), Gries points out that the former is “a story of the Chinese people’s
heroic anti-imperialist struggle”, while the latter reveals a “dark and depressing
tragedy of the past”.140 Moreover, the flag-raising ceremony was imposed to all
primary and secondary schools every Monday to promote students’ patriotic
sentiment. Even in Tiananmen Square, the solemn flag-raising ceremony is conducted
every day keep pace of the sunrise to inspire common love of the nation.
What is more, many “Patriotic Education Bases” were established to construct young
people’s historical memory. The central government issued two documents
respectively in 1991 and 1994 to explain the importance of using the existing historic
sites and establishing new “patriotic education bases” for patriotic education.141 In
1995, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that there were 100 sited selected as the
national-level “Patriotic Education Bases” around the whole country. It is worth
noting that, among the selected 100 sites, 40 are built to memorize China’s conflicts
with foreign invaders, including anti-Japanese War, Korean War, Opium War so on
and so forth. Among these 40 sites, 20 of them are in remembrance of the Second
Sino-Japanese War.142 In fact, the two most famous memorial sites in China are all
related to the Second Sino-Japanese War. The first one called Chinese People’s
Memorial Hall of Anti-Japanese War, which was established in 1987 and rebuilt in
1995. It is well known for an inscription written by China’s former president Jiang
Zemin, which reads: “Hold high the patriotic banner, use history to educate people,
promote and develop Chinese national spirit and rejuvenate the Chinese nation.”143
139 Zhao, Suisheng. (1998). “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen
China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(3), p.292.
140 Gries, Peter H. (2005).”Nationalism, Indignation and China’s Japan Policy,” SAIS Review, 25(2), p.109.
141 They were: “Notice about Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting
Extensively Historical Relics” issued by the CCP Central Propaganda Department in 1991 and “Outline on
Implementing Patriotic Education” issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1994.
142 Wang, Zheng. (2008). “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory:
Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” International Studies Quarterly 52, pp.795-796.
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The second one is Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, which located in the old capital
of China history. Hundreds of pictures are exhibited vividly in the museum to depict
the murder to 300,000 innocent citizens of Nanjing and Chinese soldiers by the
Japanese army. Every year, over five million people would visit this museum to
memorize the victims in the massacre.144 The message this museum intend to send is:
do not forget the immoral massacre conducted by the Japanese in Nanjing. This
museum mainly conveys a “victim” narrative of China under the hurt of Japanese
troops, and further links it to the humiliation sentiment, indicating that China is the
victim in front of both Japanese and the West.
During this “Patriotic Education Campaign”, humiliation narratives have been
increasingly embedded in governmental organizations, popular culture, and public
media. Many governmental organizations have participated in this campaign,
including CCP Central Committee, the CCP Central Propaganda Department,
Ministry of Education, the State Education Commission, the Ministry of Culture, and
the state-run television and radio stations. As a result, routine procedures regarding
the patriotic education have been developed to administer works in these agencies. In
addition, with no special case, employees of government organizations and teachers in
schools were also required to have classes about patriotic education, in order to
conduct the campaign efficiently. So for that, the content of this kind of patriotic
campaign has penetrated to every facet of lives around Chinese people through
various ways.
Influence of the new wave of victim discourse on Chinese society
It may be difficult to evaluate the influence of this “Patriotic Education Campaign”
faced the whole Chinese society, but we can consult Chinese people’s reactions to
certain issues between China and Japan as well as the results of public surveys to take
144 Sneider, Daniel. (2013). “Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and Japan,
Asia-Pacific Review,” 20(1), pp.42-44.
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a glance at the real impact of this nation-led victim discourse. In the first place,
Chinese people’s reaction on Japanese Emperor Akihito’s visit in 1992 showed that
the public attitude towards Japan had already experienced a significant change.
Although China Daily admitted that the emperor’s visit has a positive meaning, its
final conclusion was that the future of Sino-Chinese relations was still
unpredictable.145 Why did not Chinese media show many expectations on this historic
visit? In order to answer this question, it is important to see the public feeling towards
Japan at that moment. On 9th October 1992, few weeks before the emperor’s visit, the
South China Morning Post published an article about the mounting tensions between
the two countries. According to this article, military, police and universities had
received a secret document from the government that they have to be alert to a
potential demonstration by the “Chinese Popular Committee for Japanese
Reparations”, members of the committee were dissatisfied with the reconciliation with
Japan in Maoist period and Tanaka Kakuei’s ambiguous “regret”146 to China in 1972.
The article further pointed out that these people expected the emperor to give a formal
apologize for Japanese military’s atrocities in the war.147 Reported by the same article,
a poll conducted by Beijing Review showed that nearly 95% of the total 1,138
respondents considered that Japan own China a formal apology for its war crime, and
75% of them wanted Japanese government to pay the war reparation which had been
renounced by Zhou Enlai in 1972.148 If the result of this 1992 poll is true, compared
to the result of the 1989 poll in which nearly 60% Chinese respondents tended to
forgive Japan’s atrocities in the war, the attitude of Chinese people towards Japan and
the war had changed significantly. Thus natural questions here are: why Chinese
people’s views on the anti-Japanese war had transformed within just three years? Why
145
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the dissatisfaction to the 1972 renouncement of war reparation did not occur until two
decades has passed, while good bilateral contact in both economic and political had
already been built between the two countries? This article considers that this change
was from the rising of Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism had been deeply
influenced by the re-generation and popularity of the victim narrative which serves as
the most essential content in “Patriotic Education Campaign”. On 22nd June, 1989,
People’s Daily started to evoke “national humiliation” discourse again by asserting
that “for a country, to get rid of foreign enslavement and to become independent and
self-reliant are the prerequisite for its development”. It also pointed out that China
was utterly depending on and bullied by “others” before 1949.149 According to
Suzuki, compared with other imperialist countries who had invaded China before, the
aggression of the Japanese military was the most recent and bloodiest one.150 Thus,
the pre-1949 national memory of the “atrocious Japanese”, which had been veiled by
the class-based “enemy” in Maoist era, reappeared in their mind and was magnified
by the continuing “Patriotic Education Campaign”.
In the second place, national polls about Chinese people’s attitude towards Japan
started from the early-2000s provide us a useful evidence to see what kind of role
“history issue” plays to Chinese in Sino-Japanese relations at present. On the 30th
anniversary of diplomatic normalization between China and Japan in 2002, Institute of
Japanese Studies restarted national polls about Japanese image and Sino-Japanese
relations in China. Since 2002, this survey had been conducted in 2002, 2004, 2006
and 2008 separately to observe the change of Chinese people’s attitude to Japan.151 In
the first 2002 survey, when being asked the question “This year is the 30th anniversary
of the normalization of relations between China and Japan. Do you feel affinity with
149 “Zhiyou shehui zhuyi canneng jiuzhongguo” (“Only socialism can save China”), (July 22, 1989), Renminribao,
p.1.
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Japan?” only 5.9% of Chinese respondents chose the option “feel affinity” or “feel
very affinity”. It is worth mentioning that there were 53.6% of Chinese respondents
selected these two opinions in the 1989’s survey.152 In contrast, people who do not
feel affinity with Japan accounted for 43.3% of the whole respondents, and this figure
kept in a high level constantly in the following three surveys with 53.6% in 2004,
52.9% in 2006 and 58.6% in 2008. For those who do not feel an affinity to Japan,
when it comes to the reason why they feel like this, around 80% of them attributed it
to the “history issue”. To be more specific, over 60% participants pointed out that
Japan has not reproached itself for the past aggression, and nearly 20% simply ascribed
it to the war. Compared to the result of the survey in 1989, in which only 27.5% of
Chinese respondents thought that Japan had not deeply reflected on its past aggression,
the “history issue” has gradually become a main concern in Chinese side. When
talking about the question “what images pop out into your mind first when it comes to
Japan?” the option “Japanese aggression troops” were always the first or second
choice for respondents.153
Another series polls conducted jointly by the Japanese thinktank Genron NPO and
China Daily in eight consecutive years since 2005 also show that Chinese attitudes
towards Japan have a strong connection with the history memories. The survey shows
that Chinese negative views to Japanese has increased constantly and reached the
worst result in 2013 with over 92.8% Chinese hold bad views. Asked why they hold
negative views to Japan, Chinese respondents especially the students tend to give the
answers like “Japanese have invaded China” and “Japanese do not properly reflect
their aggression in wartime”. In 2011, 74.2% of general people and 71.2% students
who hold negative views to Japanese because “Japan have invaded China” while this
reason ranks the second in 2013 survey, in which the dispute around Diaoyu/Senkaku
islands becomes the first. In addition, student respondents always give higher weight
152 Jiang, Lifeng. (1989). “Zhongri lianhe jinxing de shehui yulun diaocha shuomingle shenme” (“What can the
result of the joint survey of public views tell us”), Riben wenti ziliao, 2: 22-25.
153 In 2002 and 2008, “Japanese aggression troops” ranked the first with 53.5% and 67.0% of respondents’
selection, while in 2004 and 2006, falling behind “Sakura”, this opinion ranked the second with 40.3% and 44.5%
people chose it.
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to the “apology issue” and believe Japan has not acknowledged what it did to China
sincerely. When it comes to the question “What pop up in your mind first when you
think of Japan”, Nanjing Massacre always in the top two of Chinese respondents’ list,
and the other one is Japanese electronic goods.154 Therefore, the history issue with
Japan is the main obstacle for most Chinese to see Japan. In other words, Chinese
people, especially the younger generations, have been given a particular lens to see
their neighbor Japan, through which China is always the victim who should fight back.
In the third place, strong anti-Japanese sentiments started in the new century provide a
direct example to evaluate the influence of the patriotic education on Chinese
nationalism, especially the anti-Japanese nationalism. In 1996, the publication of a
book named China Can Say No (Zhongguo Keyi Shuobu)155 symbolized that Chinese
nationalists have already become an important power in China’s society. This book
sold 50,000 copies in the first two weeks and was reprinted many times to meet the
public need. Finally, it sold as many as 3 million copies in China. The popularity of
China Can Say No symbolized Chinese nationalism’s upsurge since the middle-1990s.
If we considered the second half of 1990s was full of anti-Western, especially anti-
US sentiments, for example, the massive anti-US demonstrations in 1999 because of
the bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, then the theme of the post-2000 era
Chinese nationalism is abomination towards the Japanese. If we look back on the anti-
Japanese sentiment in Sino-Japan relations’ history, it is clear that the protests and
demonstrations against Japan in China appear much more frequently since the 21st
century.
Early in 2003, the territorial dispute on Diaoyu/Senkaku Island has already been put
on the table. The Japanese government leased three of the five islands of
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island group from a private family; this action has irritated Beijing
154 Polling data from 2011 to 2013. Retrieved on October 10, 2013, are available on the China Daily website at:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqjs/2011-08/04/content_13092005.htm;
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2012-06/19/content_15512904.htm;
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2013-08/05/content_16872036.htm;
155 Song, Qiang & Qiao, Bian. (1996). “Zhongguo keyi shuobu: lengzhanhou shidai de zhengzhi yu qinggan
xuanze” (“China can say no: political and emotional choices in the post Cold-war era”), Beijing: Zhongguo
Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe.
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and Chinese public. The event has caused a tremendous nationalism in China in the
next few months and reached a peak in June 2003.156 In August, 2003, there was an
online petition organized by Chinese netizen to call on the Chinese government not to
sign a $12 billion contract of the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway with Japan. By
drawing parallels with the Manchurian railway that Japan built in the 1920s,
protesters in China considered the new railway construction as a “re-invading” by
Japan.157 The online petition has collected over 90,000 signatures within one week. It
is worth noticing that an aggressive slogan was showed on the front page of their
website: “Heaven and Earth will not tolerate traitor. We refuse the use of Japanese
products for the Beijing–Shanghai line”.158 In the context of this slogan, if the
government finally agreed to sign this contract with the Japanese, it will become a
national “traitor” who chose to stand with the “enemy”—Japan. This “our/others” line
drew by the public forced Chinese government to postpone the high-speed railway
contract with Japan. Then, on 4th August, the “Gas Incident” in the city Qiqihar
incurred a quick and furious reaction from the public. Over a million Chinese people
have signed on a petition, which demanded Japanese to resolve the chemical weapons
problem.159 On September 18th, 2003, Chinese nationalists quickly transferred their
attention to another incident—a sex party held by Japanese businessmen in southeast
China. It stirred another anti-Japanese sentiment online. In October 2003, the
Japanese-style skit performed by Japanese students in North-western University
provoked an anti-Japanese demonstration of 7,000 people. In the year 2003, Chinese
people’s abomination towards the Japanese has been growing without any stop.
Anti-Japanese sentiment went on in 2004 and 2005. During the Asian Cup soccer
tournament in August 2004, Chinese soccer fans in many cities insulted Japanese
players orally by shouting “Sha, Sha, Sha” (Kill, Kill, Kill), and “Dadao Xiang
156 Gries, Peter H. (2005). “China's “New Thinking” on Japan,” The China Quarterly,184, PP.844-846.
157 Reilly, James. (2011). “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of
Resistance to Japan,”Modern Asian Studies, 45(2), P.475.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
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Guizimen de Toushang Kanqu” (a big sword decapitate the Japanese devil). 160 In
2005, the history textbook event and Japan’s bid for permanent membership on the
UNSC have triggered another wave of anti-Japanese emotion in China. As for the
former event, in April, a new edition of junior high school history textbook which had
sparked a tremendous dissatisfaction in China was approved by the Japanese Ministry
of Education after 4 years. This “provocative” action of Japanese government resulted
in massive anti-Japanese street protests in many Chinese cities. In Beijing,
participants smashed hundreds of electronic devices that sold in a technology hub
during the demonstration. In the spring of 2005, nearly 19 million of Chinese people
have signed on an online petition in order to against Japan’s bid for permanent
membership of the UNSC. Apart from the petition, tens of thousands of people took
to streets, andtjose extreme protesters even damaged Japanese shops and offices,
overturned and torched Japanese-brand cars, and threw eggs at the Japanese embassy
and the ambassador’s official residence.161
All in all, the patriotic campaign have got a success in stimulating public resonance,
and Japan severed as a primary “others” of China. For Chinese nationalists, Japan has
become China’s ultimate “enemy”. Any actions against it should be considered as a
true patriot. As Geremie Barmé says, “Patriotic sentiment is no longer the sole
province of the Party and its propagandists.”162 From this point, Chinese nationalists
have gradually growing beyond the government expectation, and the massive anti-
Japanese throughout the whole country since the 2000s should be seen as a good
example.
160 Yardley, Jim. (August 9, 2004). “In soccer loss, a glimpse of China’s rising ire at Japan,” New York Times.
Retrieved on October 23, 2013, from: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/09/international/asia/09china.html
161 Kang, Su-Jeong. (2013). “Anti-Japanese Popular Nationalism and China’s Approach Towards Japan amid
Sino-Japanese Political Tension, 2001–2006,” East Asia, 30, p.165.
162 Barmé, Geremie. (1995). “To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde Nationalism,” The China
Journal, 34, pp.211-212.
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Conclusion
The sense of national humiliation of Chinese people derives from a huge
psychological gap between an Empire and a peripheral nation-state which invaded by
foreign imperialists in the 19th century and early 20th century. Base on the glorious
5,000-year civilization in the past, history of being invaded by the foreigners makes the
Chinese feel difficult to accept, and the gap between the past prosperity and what
happened in contemporary society let Chinese people tend to define the latter as a
“national humiliation”. In the “Century” Chinese people did suffer a lot, and the
memories of the wartime have deeply rooted in Chinese people’s mind. However,
direct war experience and the meaning attached it are not the same. Apart from history
itself, the narrative of history is significant in constructing a nation’s identity. Besides,
this “national humiliation” myth determines the way how Chinese deal with the
Western and its immediate neighbor—Japan. Looking back on the humiliation
narrative in different periods since 1915, this thesis contends that China's humiliation
discourse is an integral part of the shaping of national identity and Japan plays an
important role in it.
In the first place, it concludes that the ruling governments play an indispensable role
in using the humiliation narrative to shape China’s national identity. As John Gills
argues, “[T]he core meaning of any individual or group identity…is sustained by
remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity.”163 This
thesis believes that Chinese political elites, particularly, the ruling governments
determine the “assumed identity”. They play an essential role in shaping the nation’s
identity by embedding certain narratives into the public’s mind.
The narrative of the national past helps construct China’s identities in different
periods with different meanings. The discourse of the “Century of National
Humiliation” first emerged in January 1915 when Japanese imperialist impose the
163 Gillis, John R. (1996). Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, p.5
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unequal treaty—“Twenty-one Demand” on Chinese Beiyang government (1912-1927),
which seriously violated Chinese national sovereignty. Soon after Yuan Shikai’s sign of
the “Twenty-one Demand” with Japan on May 9th, 1915, the public tended to mark this
event as a national humiliation. During this short period, social power played more
active roles in popularizing the national humiliation narrative than government in
mobilizing Chinese people. When the Kuomin Party (KMT) took over the office in the
late 1920s, national humiliation discourse had gradually served as a government
instrumental tool to construct a uniform national identity. Different from Beiyang era,
the KMT government played a more active role in popularizing the discourse of
national humiliation. It inherited the humiliation narrative and then summarized all
those previous national humiliation days into an official calendar, and reset them in a
legal way. In other words, the KTM authority had become the only legal actor to
control the myth of “national humiliation”. All in all, the victim narrative was a
dominant theme in the pre-1949 era. From 1949 to the end of 1980s, victim narrative
had totally disappeared in Chinese civil society. From Mao’s perspective, China was a
“victor” rather than a “victim”. The assertion that CCP’s role was the main cause of
Japan’s surrender had dominated the whole country. While between the late-1970s
and the late-1980s, neither “victor narrative” nor “victim narrative” were used by the
government to construct a national identity. Based on the “reform and opening up”
policy, Chinese government has gradually changed from an idealist to a pragmatist
who put top priority on the development of the domestic economy. Yet, when the
spring of 1989 came, everything was changed. The 1989 Tiananmen Incident made the
party leader Deng Xiaoping to reflect on his previous strategy, and decided to attach
more importance on ideological education to maintain the communist regime.
Therefore, soon after 1989, the “Patriotic Education Campaign” was launched by the
Party, and the “Century of National Humiliation” discourse thus was rediscovered by
the government to legitimize its rule and help to overcome the regime crises.
In the second place, this thesis concludes that Japan plays an important role in the
construction of China’s national identity. More specifically, Chinese people’s hostility
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towards Japan is rooted in the evolution of the national humiliation discourses. Over
the pre-1949 era, when the Beiyang government signed the “Twenty-One Demand”
with Japan, the latter had first become an immoral “other” for China’s national
humiliation discourses. The popularization of the narrative of national humiliation
gave an upsurge of Chinese people’s anti-Japanese sentiments. Japan became China’s
major “enemy” at that time. Later, the KMT government further constructed Japan as a
“national enemy” to motivate the population to prepare for the upcoming war. During
this time, Japan’s increasingly deepening important role in Chinese humiliation myth
was reflected not only by the establishment and the practice of the “National
Humiliation Days”, but also through the official propaganda goals which was
characterized by anti-Japanese discourses. After CCP’s come to power in 1949, the
official emphasis on “atrocious Japan” disappeared in accordance with the absence of
victim narrative from Chinese society during Mao’s era. Being conscious of great
threats from the KMT-led regime and its US ally, communist government determined
to anchor new Chinese national identity of communist ideology and intended to draw
Japan into its Communist Camp. In this sense, the mass good Japanese people were
separated from those few bad militarists and considered as Chinese people’s “friends”.
After Maoist era, Japan was neither a friend nor a foe but an important cooperative
partner for China. Since the government’s pragmatic approach towards Japan, the
Sino-Japanese relationship reached a peak in 1980s in both official level and public
level. “Bad” history between China and Japan seemed to be no longer an obstacle of
the future Sino-Japanese relation in this period. Yet, when the spring of 1989 came,
everything changed. Japan regained its character as a typical “other” through the
“Patriotic Education Campaign”. Although the initial objective of this “Patriotic
Education Campaign” is to regain CCP’s moral legitimacy, Japan has been
constructed as a typical “other” to attain this goal by inspiring Chinese people’s
patriotism. As a result, a “devil” Japan—a country who has invaded China, killed
innocent Chinese without guilty, and even try to remove it from history— has
gradually come into Chinese people’s mind again.
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After examining the period from 1915 to the new century, it is clear that there is no
certain consistency in the interpretations of the humiliation throughout the last 100
years in China. The national humiliation discourse had once disappeared in China from
1950s to 1980s. However, whether humiliation discourse dominants civil society or not,
the ruling governments always play an essential role in shaping the nation’s identity
by embedding certain narratives into the public’s mind. Besides, in this process of the
construction of China’s national identity, Japan has been an indispensable “other”.
Since humiliation “is one of the modes used to draw ethical boundaries between self
and other, between domestic and foreign”,164 the popularization and intensification of
humiliation discourse in China were always associated with anti-Japanese sentiments.
As a consequence, in Chinese context, Japan always assumes the role as an “enemy”
when the humiliation/victim narrative dominates the civil society. In other words,
Japan’s role as an immoral “other” will intensify China’s self identity as a victim.
164 Callahan, William (2004). “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,”
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(2), p. 203.
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